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“Leave Them Kids Alone”1 
A Proposed Fair Use Defense For Noncommercial  
P2P Sharing of Copyrighted Music Files 
Jeremy Scott* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Technology is, at once, the “alpha” and “omega” of copyright law.  
The “alpha” of copyright law was a single invention,2 the printing 
press, which spawned a publishing industry that required government 
protection from acts of commercial piracy.3  The “omega” has come, at 
various times, in a series of paradigm shifts brought about by new 
technologies.4  These breakthroughs have often forced our legal sys-
tem to revisit outdated rules that were unable to embrace the benefits 
of these new technologies in the marketplace.5  In fact, we are current-
ly in the midst of such a paradigm shift, and online file sharing is set to 
become the “omega” of a copyright holder’s control over noncom-
mercial sharing of his expressive works.  
                                                                                                                           
 * J.D., 2007, Florida International University College of Law.  I would like to thank Pro-
fessor Hannibal Travis for guiding me, ever so patiently, through the ins and outs of copyright 
law and the fair use doctrine, and Eddie Rodriguez, for his helpful, knowledgeable and practical 
suggestions regarding the best way to go about doing this project.  I would also like to extend my 
thanks to all of the other members of the FIU Law Review for their patience, support and en-
couragement. 
1 Roger Waters, Another Brick in the Wall, Pt. 2, on THE WALL (Sony 1987). 
 2 There are historical precursors to what we now know as copyright law, but the time 
required to hand-copy books before the invention of the printing press served as a substantial 
barrier to commercial piracy. See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem With Congress and Copyright 
Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 377-78 
(2004). See also discussion infra Part III(a)(i). 
 3 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-31 (1984). 
 4 See id. at 430 n.11 (noting Congressional responses in copyright law to new technolo-
gies). 
 5 See, e.g., White-Smith Music v. Apollo, 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908) (noting that “the use of [pi-
ano] rolls, in the absence of statutory protection, enables the manufacturers thereof to enjoy the 
use of musical compositions for which they pay no value[,]” but holding that “such considera-
tions properly address themselves to the legislative, and not to the judicial, branch of the gov-
ernment.”); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (noting that the 
advent of the photocopying machine brought “grave uncertainty of the coverage of ‘copy’ in 
Section 1 of the 1909 [Copyright Act] and [expressing] doubt [as to] whether it relates at all to 
periodicals.”). 
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American and English legal history support a vision of copyright 
law that is grounded in the premise that copyright exists primarily to 
maximize public benefit: Once a given work is published, it enters the 
public domain, but the rights given to those members of the public 
who possess the work are limited in a manner consistent with the pub-
lic interest of encouraging authors and artists to create new works.6  
This public interest is the “purpose” of statutory copyright protection, 
and the “method” chosen to achieve that purpose is a limited statuto-
ry monopoly endorsed by the government, which imposes restrictions 
on the use of expressive works in a manner that maximizes an au-
thor’s incentive to create further works.7 
Part II of this article examines the emerging technology of file 
sharing and its current status under copyright jurisprudence.  This Part 
also dissects a number of previously proposed solutions to the file 
sharing “problem,” and ultimately sets forth the premise that non-
commercial file sharing between private individuals should be consi-
dered a fair use for three basic reasons: (1) the Copyright Act of 1976 
fails to adequately address the nuances of P2P file sharing, and courts 
should wait for Congress to act, rather than stepping into Congress’s 
shoes and cobbling together a doctrine of their own; (2) there is a sub-
stantial public benefit in the broad dissemination of expressive con-
tent brought about by P2P file sharing systems; and (3) while it is 
questionable whether noncommercial file sharing actually harms the 
commercial interests of copyright holders, it cannot, specifically in the 
case of music sharing, be shown to harm the artists’ incentive to create.  
Therefore, when one considers the significant public interest in effi-
cient dissemination of expressive content, the vast superiority of P2P 
as a mode of dissemination, the fact that the current record industry 
does not efficiently incentivize the majority of artists, and the constitu-
tional mandate to apply the statutory monopoly in a limited fashion 
that directly addresses whether it is incentivizing the creation of ex-
pressive content, one could rationally conclude that noncommercial 
file sharing should be allowed.  
Part III of the article examines the history of copyright law, and 
asks whether modern legislative interpretations of the Copyright 
Clause such as the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),8 and judi-
                                                                                                                           
 6 Dallon, supra note 2, at 368-71. See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: 
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 135-44 (2003) (comparing the American “pub-
lic interest” perspective on copyright with the French tradition of granting copyright based on 
the moral rights of authors). 
 7 See discussion infra Part III(c). 
 8 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) 
[hereinafter “CTEA”]. 
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cial doctrines such as the application of “fair use,” are consistent with 
the underlying public interest rationale for copyright.  This Part also 
details the argument that historically, copyright law was designed to 
protect the commercial interests of publishers, an interest that may no 
longer be sacrosanct in the digital environment, and explains why art-
ists’ interests and the public’s interests may be misaligned with the 
interests of the current generation of copyright holders.  If that much 
is clear, then the ultimate question becomes one of method.  Clearly 
Congress can act to expand or limit the protections afforded copyright 
holders, but courts need not be complicit in Congress’s approach. They 
also have the authority, under the Constitution and the fair use doc-
trine, to jettison the surplus protection necessary in a pre-P2P market 
and realign the monopoly afforded by copyright with the public bene-
fit and the artists’ incentive to create expressive works. 
Part IV of this article examines the fair use doctrine in detail; first 
from a theoretical perspective, and second in its application to new 
technologies.  This Part ultimately argues that fair use should be ex-
panded to examine, in the event of a noncommercial use, whether a 
given copyright restriction advances or curtails the public interest, and 
can be shown to be a disincentive to creation.  This analysis requires 
balancing the artists’ monetary incentive to create new works with the 
public’s interest in the enjoyment of those works, but this section ul-
timately sets forth that we should approach infringement permissively 
where there is no direct commercial benefit conferred upon those co-
pying their material. 
Applying this rationale to the recording industry, it becomes clear 
that the artists’ incentive to create music, on average, is not harmed 
significantly by file sharing, because the vast majority of profit from 
the production and sale of CDs is retained by the record companies,9 
and only a small amount goes to the artists themselves.10  But the very 
nature of the Internet makes the primary historical functions of the 
record company—the production, marketing and distribution of 
CDs—unnecessary.  Because there is a great public benefit in having 
both public domain and copyrighted material available on P2P net-
works, and because the monetary incentives retained by artists from 
the sale of their records are so small, noncommercial file sharing on 
these networks should be a fair use. 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See generally Lee Ann Obringer, Howstuffworks – How Music Royalties Work, at 
http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/music-royalties.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
 10 Id. 
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II.   FILE SHARING: THE (INADVERTENT) CELESTIAL (PANDORA’S) 
JUKEBOX 
In 1995, the Information Infrastructure Task Force (“IITF”)11 
coined the term, “Celestial Jukebox,” theorizing that at some point in 
the not-too-distant future, advances in communications technology 
would enable instantaneous access to all manner of on-demand con-
tent, including movies, music, games, and anything else a user could 
want that had been digitized.12  At the time, the IITF thought it would 
be necessary to readdress some of the core concepts of intellectual 
property law in order to encourage copyright holders to participate in 
this new medium for dissemination.13  According to Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 
Bruce A. Lehman: 
[a]ll the computers, telephones, fax machines, scanners, 
cameras, keyboards, televisions, monitors, printers, switches, 
routers, wires, cables, networks and satellites in the world 
will not create a successful [Celestial Jukebox], if there is no 
content.  What will drive the [Celestial Jukebox] is the con-
tent moving through it.14 
The IITF was absolutely right about the promise of the technolo-
gies it was studying.  The Internet infrastructure has a fabulous poten-
tial to disseminate information on a never-before-seen scale.  It is by 
far the cheapest and fastest distribution mechanism for expressive or 
informative works the world has ever seen.  What the IITF did not 
count on was the “culture of free” that grew up in this environment, 
and that has been responsible for the explosive growth and develop-
ment of the Internet over the last ten years.15  The Internet turned out 
                                                                                                                           
 11 For a discussion of the mandate of and the procedure taken by the IITF in the mid-
nineties, see Cassandra Infeld & Victoria Smith Ekstrand, The Music Industry and the Legislative 
Development of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Online Service Provider Provision, 10 
COMM. L. & POL’Y. 291, 297-300 (2005). 
 12 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 187 (discussing the impact of the IITF’s “white paper” 
on the future of digital technology and examining the concept of the “Celestial Jukebox”); see 
also INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 222 (1995) available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf (coining the term, “celestial jukebox”). 
 13 See Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the 
Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights: Hearing on S. 1284 and H.R. 2441 Before the 
House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (Statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant 
Sec’y of Commerce and Comm’r of Patents and Trademarks), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/nii-hill.html. 
 14 Id. at 6. 
 15 Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 1, 4 (2004). 
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to be a place where content was freely disseminated and shared be-
tween individuals, not hoarded by them.16  It is a simple quirk of hu-
man behavior that was largely unanticipated by the IITF: There was 
no need for the government to sponsor the provision of content over 
the Internet in order to create some kind of “Celestial Jukebox,” be-
cause users would provide the content themselves, but when the users 
provided that content, they would not care to distinguish between 
what was copyrighted and what was not.17  
As a result, Pandora’s Box had been opened.  As technology im-
proved, providing ever-faster access to ever-broader content, copy-
right holders sought refuge from the “culture of free” through litiga-
tion.  The courts, for their part, were ill-equipped to deal fairly with 
the issue.  They were left interpreting a Copyright Act that was too old 
to address the changes wrought by the Internet, and applying that Act 
to technologies that were too young to be fully understood.  The re-
sults of these litigation efforts created a tennis match of law and tech-
nology that continues to this day.  And nowhere is the futility of at-
tempting to place restrictions on noncommercial sharing between us-
ers more evident than in cases dealing with online file sharing. 
A.  The File Sharing Controversy 
It seems appropriate that a discussion of the copyright ramifica-
tions of file sharing should begin by examining the underlying tech-
nology.  After all, without this technology, infringement of music copy-
rights over the Internet would be impossible (or improbable), and 
there would be no need to delve into questions about the nature of 
noncommercial copyright infringement or whether, sans protection 
against this infringement, artists would stop making music.18  Copy-
right law is unique in that its development is inevitably and inexorably 
tied to the conveniences offered by new technologies.19  In fact, this 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See id. 
 17 See generally id. 
 18 This is mentioned by the Founding Fathers as the reason for their grant of statutory 
monopolies, which, in a diffused form, exist in the Copyright Act. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 8 (“promot[ing] the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”) (emphasis added), with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) 
(establishing that “the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to . . . authorize” reproduction, 
the preparation of derivative works, distribution, public performance, display, and digital sound 
transmissions) (emphasis added), and 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (establishing that a “fair use of a 
copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright”). 
 19 See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (noting that “the 
main reason why determination of the question [of whether library photocopying can constitute 
a fair use] is so difficult is that the text of the Copyright Act of 1909, which governs the case, does 
not supply, by itself, a clear or satisfactory answer”), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (noting that “[s]ound policy, as 
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entire area of law became necessary largely because of a single tech-
nological development—the printing press20—and subsequent innova-
tions have forced it to develop from narrow protections designed to 
serve the commercial interests of early publishers to the legal jungle 
we know today.21  In this push-pull relationship between law and tech-
nology, it is important to understand the technology first, so that we 
may accurately assess the law.  
File sharing, at its most basic, is a “Frankenstein” of other tech-
nologies.  The most prominent are file transferring, search engines and 
compressed file architectures like the mp3 file format.22  File transfer-
ring enables users to send information directly from computer to 
computer across a network.  A user enters some physical information, 
which his computer transforms into digital information, then sends 
that information to another computer, via a modem, DSL line or other 
device, where it is decoded at the other end.23  The ability to transfer 
files between one computer and another is an inherent component of 
the architecture of the Internet.  
The search engine is simply a “software program that searches a 
database and gathers and reports information that contains or is re-
lated to specified terms.”24  In a nutshell, a user enters terms from his 
own computer and the search engine “searches” for those terms on a 
given network.  That network can be large enough to include the en-
tire Internet, or it can be very small, accessing only a limited database 
of materials.  Search engine technology is an extremely valuable me-
thod of navigating the information available on the Internet.  Some of 
the larger search engines, like Yahoo! and Google, have become part 
                                                                                                                           
well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innova-
tions alter the market for copyrighted materials”); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 395 (1968) (noting, in a case dealing with new television signal dissemination 
technology, that “our inquiry [into the meaning of the Copyright Act] cannot be limited to ordi-
nary meaning and legislative history, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the devel-
opment of the electronic phenomena with which we deal here”). 
 20 Dallon, supra note 2, at 366-67; see generally ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING 
REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1983). 
 21 See LEONARDAS VYTAUTAS GERULAITIS, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING IN FIFTEENTH-
CENTURY VENICE 30-43 (1976) (discussing the various privileges afforded to printers by Euro-
pean governments). 
 22 Modern file sharing programs like Kazaa are larger and have the ability to share a wider 
variety of files, such as programs and movies, but this does not change the basic design architec-
ture of file sharing programs. 
 23 See generally Robert Frieden, MSN Encarta – Telecommunications (2005), at 
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761566546_1/Telecommunications.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2006). 
 24 “Search Engine,” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 
1995), available at http://www.ask.com/reference/dictionary/ahdict/58678/search+engine (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
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of our cultural lexicon.25  These large-scale search engines are designed 
to search the World Wide Web for pages matching users’ queries,26 but 
the potential uses of search engine technology are not limited to the 
World Wide Web.  In fact, a searchable database can be built any way 
a designer wishes, provided he has sufficient technical skills.  
The second technological innovation, which was not directly re-
sponsible for file sharing technology but had a huge impact on its ear-
ly viability, is the mp3 file format.  Music is encoded on CDs in what is 
called a “.wav” or “wave” format, which consumes a great deal of 
computer memory27 because the format contains a broad spectrum of 
sounds.  Wave files are less suitable for Internet distribution because 
their “size,” the amount of information one would have to transfer 
over the web, would make download times prohibitively long.  The 
mp3 format uses what is called “perceptual noise shaping,” a compres-
sion algorithm that “cuts out” aspects of a recording that a human ear 
cannot hear, resulting in greatly reduced file sizes that are suitable for 
dissemination on the Internet.28  Although modern file sharing net-
works share many file types other than the mp3, the idea of trading 
mp3s, and arguably a lack of industry involvement in early Internet 
distribution, spurred the evolution of file sharing technology. 
All file-sharing technologies share a similar set of underlying cha-
racteristics.  At their most basic level, they allow end-users to access a 
“network” of other computers using the same program.29  Once this 
network of computers is accessed, a built-in search engine allows users 
to send out requests for a particular file and receive a list of other 
computers that have that particular file available.30  Once the list is 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Google has even achieved “verb” status.  To “google” someone means to search for 
background information about them on the Web using the popular search engine. See “Google,” 
Webster’s New Millennium Dictionary of English, Preview Edition (2005), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=google (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
 26 Both can search for pictures as well, but it is not possible for Google or Yahoo! to search 
solely for mp3 files. 
 27 Marshall Brian, Howstuffworks – “How MP3 Files Work” (2005), at 
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/mp31.htm (noting that “the average [three minute long] 
song on a CD consumes about 32 million bytes of space,” which is “a lot of space for one song, 
and it's especially large when you consider that over a 56K modem, it would take close to two 
hours to download that one song,” and that “[t]he goal of the MP3 format is to compress a CD-
quality song by a factor of 10 to 14 without noticably [sic] affecting the CD-quality sound.”). 
 28 See id. (noting that “[w]ith MP3, a 32-megabyte (MB) song on a CD compresses down 
to about 3 MB. This lets you download a song in minutes rather than hours, and store hundreds 
of songs on your computer’s hard disk without taking up that much space”). 
 29 See Hillary M. Kowalski, Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Technological Sabotage Tactics: 
No Legislation Required, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 297, 299 (2004) (discussing P2P net-
work architectures). 
 30 See Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and 
Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1764-66, 1773-
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compiled, users can click on a file name or an icon, connect to one of 
the other computers on the network, and download the file to their 
own computer.31  Once the file is downloaded, it is placed in a folder 
and may be made available to other users performing their own 
searches.32  In this fashion, files are replicated, multiplied, and propa-
gated throughout a given network.33  Of course, the network does not 
discriminate whether a given file is copyrighted or not; in fact, without 
a layer of “filtering” software, it would be unable to do so.  The 
“choice” of whether to share copyrighted material has been left up to 
users, and users have overwhelmingly chosen to share.34 
There are essentially three iterations of file sharing technologies.  
“Direct” networks are the simplest form of file sharing, and it would 
probably be inappropriate to even classify them as “P2P” per se.  In a 
“direct network,” users log on or simply visit a website connected to a 
server that contains media files for download.  The user then clicks on 
an icon and downloads or streams the file directly from the website.35  
“Centralized” P2P networks use central servers as a “hub,” indexing 
the names of each file shared by a given computer and disseminating 
those names to users looking for similar files to download.36  “Decen-
tralized” P2P networks are the offspring of the legal failings of “cen-
tralized” models.  In these networks, some computers act as “nodes,” 
                                                                                                                           
76 (2001) (discussing Napster [centralized] and Gnutella [decentralized] file sharing architec-
tures); See also Lisa J. Beyer Sims, Mutiny on the Net: Ridding P2P Pirates of their Booty, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1907, 1910 (2003) (discussing P2P technology). 
 31 See generally Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1761 (2001). 
 32 See Universal Music Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd., [2005] F.C.A. 
1242, § 62 (noting that by default, the Kazaa P2P system “can be the subject of a search result 
provided to another Kazaa user and a copy of that file can be transferred from the supplying 
user’s My Shared Folder to the searching user’s computer” although that option is cancelable by 
the user). 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005) 
(noting that, according to plaintiff’s calculations, 90 percent of music available on defendant’s 
FastTrack network was copyrighted); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 
(9th Cir. 2001) (noting “evidence of massive, unauthorized downloading and uploading of plain-
tiffs’ copyrighted works--as many as 10,000 files per second by defendant’s own admission”).  
 35 See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describ-
ing the “direct network” technology offered to users by MP3.com). 
 36 Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An 
Empirical Analysis 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March2004.pdf [hereinafter “Oberholzer & 
Strumpf Report”]. Oberholzer and Strumpf also discuss a third type of network called a “hybr-
id” network, but the distinction between “hybrid” and “decentralized is not substantial enough, 
on a legal level, to warrant discussion here. Id. 
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and connect on their own to other computers in the network without 
accessing any centralized “hub.”37 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.
38 is a precursor to many of 
the modern P2P network cases.  The defendant, MP3.com, owned a 
website which contained “tens of thousands of popular CDs in which 
plaintiffs held the copyrights.”39  Ironically, MP3.com, unlike later file 
sharing programs, took steps to prevent unauthorized access to copy-
righted music files.  
[I]n order to first access [the copyrighted recordings], a sub-
scriber to MP3.com must either “prove” that he already 
owns the CD version of the recording by inserting his copy 
of the commercial CD into his computer CD-Rom drive for 
a few seconds . . . or must purchase the CD from one of de-
fendant’s cooperating online retailers. . . .40  
Because of these modifications, MP3.com felt it could safely as-
sert a defense of fair use,41 a traditional harbor for defendants in copy-
right infringement cases.  MP3.com argued that since it took pains to 
prevent those who did not already own a CD from accessing its music 
files, its listeners were merely engaging in what it termed “transforma-
tive space shifting,” moving music from their CDs to their computers 
by using the MP3.com service.42  This underlying use, MP3.com argued, 
was fair: (1) because it was transformative from one format to anoth-
er; (2) because it did not allow users to copy CDs which they did not 
already own;43 and (3) because there was, at that time, no other me-
thod of receiving MP3 files over the Internet.  Therefore, MP3.com 
was providing an important service which was unavailable anywhere 
else.  The court, however, noting that the “defendant [sought] to at-
tract a sufficiently large subscription base to draw advertising and 
otherwise make a profit” from its use of the copyrighted material, held 
that a defense based on the “fair use” of “transformative space shift-
ing” could not stand.44 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Id. 
 38 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 349. 
 39 Id. at 350. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id.   See also discussion infra Part IV. 
 42 Id. at 351. 
 43 Ironically, this space shifting argument was accepted in the context of portable mp3 
players. See Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 
F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the denial of an injunction against a portable MP3 
player manufacturer because “the Rio's operation is entirely consistent with the [Home Record-
ing Act of 1992’s] main purpose – the facilitation of personal use”). 
 44 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 351. 
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In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,45 the court dealt with its 
first “true” file-sharing program.  Napster was designed and built 
along a “centralized” model, allowing users to access an index of file 
listings maintained by a centralized set of servers owned by the defen-
dant.46  Napster’s servers, unlike MP3.com’s, did not contain any copy-
righted material at all; they merely indexed lists of files contained on 
the computers of other Napster users.47  The plaintiffs brought suit 
against Napster for both contributory infringement (knowingly facili-
tating direct infringement by other users), and vicarious infringement 
(supervising, controlling, and financially benefiting from the infringe-
ment of others).48  The court dealt with the issue of whether Napster, 
because it maintained the indexing servers, had the ability, and there-
fore the obligation, to prevent infringement on its network.49  In re-
sponse to these allegations, Napster sought refuge, like MP3.com, un-
der the fair use doctrine, setting forth two possible scenarios that 
should be considered “fair uses” of the Napster system.50 
The first argument proffered by Napster was that those uploading 
and downloading files onto its system were “sampling” music in order 
to decide whether they liked it enough to buy it.51  Under a sampling 
rationale, Napster argued, record sales were actually increasing as a 
result of people having access to the music and being able to listen to 
it before they bought it.52  The court ultimately held that this argument 
was unavailing, making the point that “sampling” affected the hither-
                                                                                                                           
 45 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 46 See id. at 1011-13 (describing the mechanics of Napster’s P2P interface); Oberholzer & 
Strumpf Report, supra note 37, at 6-7. 
 47 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012 (noting that “the Napster server software obtains the 
Internet address of the requesting user and the Internet address of the ‘host user’ (the user with 
the available files),” that the server then “communicate[s] the host user’s Internet address to the 
requesting user.,” and that the “requesting user’s computer uses this information to establish a 
connection with the host user and downloads a copy of the contents of the MP3 file from one 
computer to the other over the Internet, ‘peer-to-peer.’”) (citations omitted). 
 48 Id. at 1019-22 (discussing Napster’s liability for contributory infringement); id. at 1022-
24 (discussing Napster’s liability for vicarious infringement). 
 49 See id. at 1021 (reaffirming and applying to Napster a prior holding stating “that if a 
computer system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails 
to purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct in-
fringement.”). 
 50 Id. at 1017-19. 
 51 Id. at 1018. 
 52 Id. Both the district and appellate courts rejected Napster’s proffered evidence of in-
creased record sales as a result of sampling, stating that evidence of “increased sales of copy-
righted material attributable to unauthorized use should not deprive the copyright holder of the 
right to license the material.” Id. 
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to-untapped downloading market negatively, and reasoned that the 
more “samples” were downloaded, the less music would be sold.53   
The second argument raised by Napster was that many of the in-
dividuals were merely grabbing digital copies of music that they al-
ready owned on CD in order to listen to that music on their comput-
ers.54  This “space shifting” rationale was also rejected by the court 
because users did not merely copy CDs they owned by using Napster, 
but they potentially made those CDs available to millions of people.55  
It was this availability that undermined the persuasiveness of the 
“space shifting” argument, although it did not undermine the idea of 
“space shifting” in and of itself.56 
Napster relied upon a central server to process and store requests 
by users, so it was comparatively easy for the court to decide that the 
company had constructive notice of infringing acts committed by users 
of its network.  In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,57 on the other hand, 
presented a different scenario, and seems to have changed the balance 
of what constitutes infringement.  In Aimster, the court held that the 
defendant was subject to contributory liability for infringing acts by 
those on its network in spite of the fact that it had no actual know-
ledge of such acts.58  The court’s reasoning suggested that the defen-
dant had willfully attempted to blind itself by designing its program in 
a manner that prevented its distributor from examining the activities 
of individual users.59  In his holding, Judge Richard Posner also noted 
that:  
It is not enough, as we have said, that a product or service 
be physically capable . . . of a noninfringing use. Aimster has 
failed to produce any evidence that its service has ever been 
used for a noninfringing use . . . . 60 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. This holding was made first by the district court and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. 
See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 896, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 54 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 55 See id. (pointing out that “it is obvious that once a user lists a copy of music he already 
owns on the Napster system in order to access the music from another location, the song be-
comes “available to millions of other individuals,” not just the original CD owner.”).  
 56 Id.  But see Recording Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 
(9th Cir. 1999) (allowing a fair use defense based on space shifting where the plaintiff demon-
strated that defendant’s product allowed people to rip tracks from their CDs in order to put 
them on the defendant’s mp3 player). 
 57 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 58 See id. at 650-51 (holding that “that a service provider that would otherwise be a contri-
butory infringer does not obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself from actual know-
ledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is being used.”).  
 59 Id. at 653 (surmising that “Aimster blinded itself in the hope that by doing so it might 
[avoid liability]”). 
 60 Id. 
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Thus, the burden seems to have been shifted to the producer of a 
product in order to determine whether a user has engaged in a sub-
stantial noninfringing use.  Under the court’s holding in Aimster, it 
would seem that if actual infringing uses significantly outweigh actual 
non-infringing uses, a product’s producer would be liable whether it 
intended for those uses to occur or not.61  This seems to contravene the 
standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,62 which stated that in order to 
defeat secondary liability, a product need only be capable of a “sub-
stantial noninfringing use.”63 
The standard set forth in Sony should have made Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
64 a foregone conclusion.  
The technology in that case was different than the technologies in 
both Napster and Aimster; and the defendants maintained no control 
at all over the end-user’s use of its product once it reached the mar-
ket.65  The network developed by Grokster was a completely “decen-
tralized” model that consisted solely of end-users’ computers.66  Unlike 
the defendant in Napster, Grokster did not have any control, and was 
therefore not participating in infringement in the sense contemplated 
by vicarious or contributory liability.67  Furthermore, it would have 
been impossible, under the theory preferred in Aimster, to find that 
Grokster had constructive notice of actual infringement using its 
product because Grokster did not participate in any way in the use of 
the product after it was downloaded from the company’s website.68  In 
a nutshell, Grokster had created a product that had characteristics 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Judge Posner also noted that the tutorials for the defendant’s product used nothing but 
copyrighted music as examples of what could be uploaded and downloaded, which seems to 
leave open the possibility, which is later explored by the United States Supreme Court in Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2768 (2005), that the manner in 
which a given product is advertised can have a significant impact on the court’s legal view of the 
purpose and possible uses of the product. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652. 
 62 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 63 Id. at 789. 
 64 125 S. Ct. 2764. 
 65 See id. at 2772 (noting that “Grokster and StreamCast do not [] know when particular 
files are copied”). 
 66 See id. at 2771; Oberholzer & Strumpf Report, supra note 36, at 6. 
 67 Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75 (discussing the district and appellate court 
analyses of the standards for contributory and vicarious liability and their impact on Grokster’s 
secondary liability) with  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-24 (9th Cir. 
2001) (applying the established standards of contributory and vicarious infringement to Nap-
ster). 
 68 Compare Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75 (conceding that it would be impossible for 
Grokster to have knowledge of specific acts of infringement on its network) with In re Aimster 
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that “Aimster’s server . . . collects 
and organizes information obtained from the users,” making it possible, but for Aimster’s “will-
ful blindness,” that it could have policed its own servers). 
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legally similar to videocassette recorders, which Sony had long ago 
held to be legal.69  Grokster’s arguments, in fact, sounded nearly iden-
tical to those made by the plaintiffs in Sony and were clearly depen-
dent on the protection offered under that standard.70  Grokster set out 
to prove that at least a small portion of the music and media traded by 
its users was in the public domain, so the act of uploading and down-
loading this music was a substantial noninfringing use that should 
have saved it from liability altogether.71   
The Supreme Court, however, was not content to allow Grokster 
to escape liability under the Sony standard.  The Court imported a 
new standard of liability from patent law in order to find Grokster 
liable.72  Under the standard of “inducement” liability, a company or 
individual could be liable for the infringement of those who use its 
product if it could be shown that the company marketed the product 
with the object to promote the copyright infringement of others.73  The 
court brought up numerous examples showing that Grokster had fa-
shioned itself as “the new Napster,” encouraging former Napster users 
to switch to its service, and that it had sold advertisements on its 
product with the understanding that it would be a draw to infringing 
users.74  Thus, Grokster effectively engaged in a commercial use by 
                                                                                                                           
 69 The similarity lies in the fact that, like Sony, Grokster did not have any control over 
what the end users actually did with its product. It is one thing to say that those who have the 
ability to prevent infringement have an obligation to do so, which would be the case with the 
Napster and Aimster services, but like Sony, the only way for Grokster to control infringement 
was to simply not distribute its P2P client at all. 
 70 In Grokster, the United States Supreme Court accuses lower courts of “misunderstand-
ing” the standard for “substantial noninfringing uses” set forth in Sony. Compare Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (holding that to escape contribu-
tory liability, “a product need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses”), with Grok-
ster, 125 S. Ct. at 2774-75, 2778-79 (discussing how, by finding that Grokster was capable of a 
“substantial noninfringing use,” the Ninth Circuit “misapplied” the Court’s holding in Sony).  It 
seems rather brusque of the Court to apply a hitherto-unknown standard of “inducement” liabil-
ity in Grokster and to criticize the lower courts for applying what, at the time, was the only exist-
ing precedent. See id. at 2770 (holding, for the first time, “that one who distributes a device with 
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affir-
mative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties”).  
 71 See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2785-86 (discussing the defendant’s “substantial noninfringing 
use” argument). 
 72 Id. at 2779-80 (characterizing patent law’s “inducement rule [as] a sensible one for copy-
right . . . .”). 
 73 Id. at 2779. 
 74 This evidence of the defendant’s efforts to promote infringement included: 
 
[i]nternal company documents indicat[ing] that StreamCast hoped to attract large 
numbers of former Napster users if that company was shut down by court order or 
otherwise, and that StreamCast planned to be the next Napster[; a] kit developed by 
StreamCast to be delivered to advertisers [which] contained press articles about 
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making a “market” out of copyright infringement that it knew would 
occur under its network.75 
An important theme in the line of cases above is commercial 
benefit. In each case, the defendants derived some kind of commercial 
benefit from copying by users.  It is important to make a distinction 
here- P2P users may not be deriving a direct commercial benefit from 
downloading songs.  They are, at most, deriving an indirect benefit by 
not having to buy CDs, and since people might download music for 
free that they never would buy anyway, even that is arguably not the 
case.76  The defendants, on the other hand, are all using the users’ be-
havior to make money.  MP3.com used its library of copyrighted music 
to sell advertisements on its website and point users towards sales of 
CDs through its service; Napster, before its demise as a free-to-use file 
sharing service, had received over $85 million in business loans based 
on its technology;77 Aimster “enable[d] the member for a fee of $4.95 a 
month to download with a single click the music most often shared by 
Aimster users”;78 and Grokster sold a “potential market” of music 
downloaders to its own advertisers.79  The Supreme Court’s Sony doc-
trine has not been applied yet to relieve P2P distributors of liability.  
And it is arguably the inherent commerciality in each of these cases 
that is a sticking point for the courts.80 
What can the preceding cases tell us about the current legality of 
file sharing software?  With respect to Internet file sharing, courts 
seem to be playing a cat-and-mouse game with technology innovators.  
                                                                                                                           
StreamCast’s potential to capture former Napster users[;] and [evidence showing 
that] it introduced itself to some potential advertisers as a company “which is similar 
to what Napster was,” . . . . [In addition, StreamCast] broadcast banner advertise-
ments to users of other Napster-compatible software, urging them to adopt its 
OpenNap. . . . An internal e-mail from a company executive stated: “We have put this 
network in place so that when Napster pulls the plug on their free service . . . or if the 
Court orders them shut down prior to that . . . we will be positioned to capture the 
flood of their 32 million users that will be actively looking for an alternative. 
 
Id. at 2773 (citations omitted). 
 75 Id. 
 76 This is the crux of the “sampling” argument made by Napster. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 
1018-19 (discussing Napster’s “sampling” fair use defense). 
 77 Brad King, Wired News: Last Rites for Napster (2002), at 
http://www.wired.com/news/busi-ness/0,1367,52532,00.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). 
 78 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 79 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2773. 
 80 On the other hand, Sony’s commercial relationship to user infringement was more pro-
tracted than any of the online file sharing services. As the Court noted, “private, noncommercial 
time-shifting in the home[,]” the most statistically significant use of VTRs, “plainly satisfies” the 
substantial noninfringing use standard. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 442 (1984). The court also noted that “primary use of the machine” for most owners was 
this noninfringing time-shifting. Id. at 423. 
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A new invention comes along; users use the invention to infringe; cop-
yright holders, unwilling to file suit against the users,81 file a suit 
against the makers of the new technology under some kind of satellite 
doctrine, such as contributory, vicarious or inducement liability; the 
courts find a way, either by adopting existing precedent or importing 
new concepts of liability, to hold the technology maker liable; and the 
technology companies go back to the drawing board and create a new 
invention that meets the qualifications set forth in the courts’ latest 
precedent.  The cycle could be endless, and the international nature of 
the Internet makes the cost of enforcing these copyrights on a collec-
tive scale prohibitive and unwieldy.  Because everyone in the world is 
connected, and because a number of governments in the world have 
different concepts of copyright,82 it may be impossible to ever fully (or 
even reasonably) regulate copyrights over the Internet.  How does 
one preserve music copyright in a file-sharing environment?  And if 
we cannot stop people from sharing copyrighted material, in the 
words of Professor Litman, how do copyright holders “compete with 
free”?83  Is file sharing litigation essentially quixotic? 
B.  Proposed File Sharing Solutions 
A number of solutions to file sharing liability have already been 
proposed to balance out the interests of the parties involved and pro-
mote broader access to materials.  They all have their faults, but they 
are a good starting point for this discussion.  The solutions proposed 
so far can be broken down into two basic categories: those focused on 
maintaining the status quo and those focused on imposing a levy or 
                                                                                                                           
 81 The RIAA does file suits against individuals infringing on file-sharing networks. Ob-
viously, however, the volume of suits is nowhere near the volume of users sharing copyrighted 
material. See generally Nick Mamatas, Meet John Doe: The RIAA Runs Its Lawsuits as a Volume 
Business, and Sometimes Downloaders Just Gotta Settle, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 7, 2005, at 34, 
available at http://www.villagevoice.com/music/0510,mamatas,61813,22.html (last visited Mar. 8, 
2006). 
 82 The European Union has a very different view of copyright, which is predicated on 
“natural law.”  GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 135-61 (discussing the philosophical and practical 
differences between European and American visions of copyright law). “The natural law or 
property right theory supports a different balancing of interests than does the [American] theory 
and supports very long – even perpetual – copyright terms.”  Dallon, supra note 2, at 443-44.  
Professor Lawrence Lessig suggests that the divergence in our modern understandings of copy-
right law could, in an historical sense, be the result of the difference between viewing copyright 
as a “property” right (which would seem to imply very broad “natural law” protection) and a 
“monopoly” right (which would seem to imply “public interest” limitations on protection). See 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE – HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO 
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 88 (2004). 
 83 Litman, supra note 15, at 35. 
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tax and distributing the proceeds based on how an expressive work 
performs in the marketplace, be that marketplace digital or analog.84 
Many of the problems with maintaining the status quo should be 
evident at this point.  The copyright statute has simple terms for en-
forcement. In order to prove copyright infringement, one needs only 
prove that a defendant (1) had access to the materials and (2) copied 
them.85  But the provisions of the copyright statute itself and the 
statements of the members of Congress involved in enacting it seem 
to suggest, at least in passing, that the statute was principally designed 
to prevent commercial infringement.86  When someone is making cop-
ies and selling them, the infringement is clear, but what happens when 
one has the ability to create a potentially infinite number of perfect 
copies of a given piece of music and wants no remuneration in return 
for their distribution?  As noted by Professor Litman: 
Under our current system, immensely talented and hard 
working composers and musicians, who create great stuff 
that people would want to buy if they knew about it, are of-
ten unable to make a living making music, because the sys-
tem we rely on to encourage the creation and dissemination 
of music works best when its products are scarce.  As a ne-
cessary corollary of a distribution mechanism that requires 
significant investment of capital in order to deliver music to 
consumers, that fact may be a regrettable but a reasonable 
sacrifice at the altar of great music.  Extending the lottery-
like nature of today's conventional music market to a digital 
world, though, where maintaining scarcity is more expensive 
than tolerating ubiquity, is profoundly dysfunctional.87 
To put this point succinctly, a copyright statute that protects against 
noncommercial distribution of music makes sense when one is trying 
to encourage the creation and publishing of a given piece of media, 
but not when there are no publishing or distribution costs to contend 
with.88  
                                                                                                                           
 84 See id. at 32-34 (discussing various solutions to P2P file sharing proposed by legal scho-
lars). 
 85 See e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (noting 
that infringement “may be inferentially proven by showing that Defendant . . . had access to the 
allegedly infringed work . . . and that one of the rights statutorily guaranteed to copyright owners 
is implicated by [his] actions.”); see 17 U.S.C. § 106, § 504 (2000). 
 86 See discussion infra Part III(b); see generally H.R. REP NO. 94-1476 (1976) (laying out 
Congress’s understanding of the 1976 Copyright Act). 
 87 Litman, supra note 15, at 35. 
 88 See discussion infra Part III(c). 
2007] “Leave Them Kids Alone” 251 
Under the old model, Congress was given a Constitutional 
mandate to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts” by 
granting a statutory copyright monopoly.89  “Promoting progress,” in 
the context of copyright, mandates that Congress employ its power to 
grant limited statutory monopolies in a manner that encourages crea-
tion and dissemination.90  An artist is encouraged to create works, un-
der the copyright clause, because if he creates something someone else 
wants to buy, the artist will be able to make money from it, and the 
law enforces his right to be the only person to do so.  The only way the 
artist can reap the benefits of the clause, however, is by disseminating 
his work.  It is important to realize that in the days before digital tech-
nology, the prospect or recording, marketing and distributing a work 
for sale throughout the United States was daunting.91  Artists would 
rarely have had the means to do this on their own, therefore publish-
ing companies were introduced into the mix.92  It was not only neces-
sary for the law to protect the artist’s remuneration, but it also had to 
offer enough of a benefit that the artist would have something to offer 
a publisher in order to encourage dissemination.  In this way, the “old” 
copyright law protects publishers interests and artist’s interests to-
gether. 
In a digital model, the additional remuneration the law formerly 
offered to encourage publishing is no longer necessary.  Publishing a 
work on the Internet is now as easy as placing the file in a shared 
folder on one’s hard drive.  Effectively, the “marginal costs” associated 
with music dissemination have disappeared.93  The only costs left are 
the “fixed costs” of creation.94  Because artists, under the current sys-
                                                                                                                           
 89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 90 Litman, supra note 15, at 2; see generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copy-
right: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 
(1970). 
 91 Litman, supra note 15, at 2. 
 92 Id. 
 93 A marginal cost is:  
 
The additional cost needed to produce or purchase one more unit[s] of a good or 
service. For example, if a firm can produce 150 units of a product at a total cost of 
$5,000 and 151 units for $5,100, the marginal cost of the 151st unit is $100.   
 
David L. Scott, Marginal Cost, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT TERMS 
FOR TODAY'S INVESTOR (2003), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=marginal%20cost (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
 94 A fixed cost is: 
 
[a] cost that remains unchanged even with variations in output.  An airline with 20 
airplanes has the fixed costs of depreciation and interest (if the planes are partially 
financed with debt), regardless of the number of times the planes fly or the number 
 
252 FIU Law Review [3:235 
tem, are rarely able to turn a profit off of the dissemination of their 
recorded works, it seems implausible to suggest that the possibility of 
financial gain from one’s recorded music serves as an incentive to cre-
ation.95 
A number of scholars have suggested that Congress deal with the 
file-sharing dilemma by imposing taxes or levies on all kinds of differ-
ent products and services. This levy or tax would then be divided ac-
cording to a given formula and distributed to copyright holders.  Pro-
fessor Neil Netanel96 suggests a “noncommercial use levy,” a fee im-
posed on products and services whose value is enhanced by P2P file 
sharing, which could include iPods and other MP3-related devices, 
blank CDs, computers, Internet access, and any number of other prod-
ucts.97  Professor Glynn Lunney98 concurs with Professor Netanel, but 
would limit his levy to “equipment and blank storage media that ena-
ble . . . copying.”99  Professor Lawrence Lessig has proposed solutions 
that involve registration of copyrighted works and unique copyright 
ID tags that could be used to redistribute the income generated by a 
tax on digital recording services, digital storage media and Internet 
access services.100  The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) has 
offered its own solution—music companies offer fans a license to 
share for a monthly fee.101 
                                                                                                                           
of seats filled on each flight.  Firms with high fixed costs tend to engage in price wars 
and cutthroat competition because extra revenues incur little extra expense.  These 
firms tend to experience wide swings in profits.  
 
David L. Scott, Fixed Cost, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT TERMS 
FOR TODAY’S INVESTOR (2003), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=marginal%20cost (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
 95 Litman, supra note 15, at 31-32.  Unfortunately, artists rarely turn a profit from their 
recorded works. Singer Janis Ian posits that “everyone is forgetting the main way an artist be-
comes successful - exposure.  Without exposure, no one comes to shows, no one buys CDs, no one 
enables you to earn a living doing what you love.”  Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle – An Alterna-
tive View, PERFORMING SONGWRITER MAG., Jun. 2002, available at 
http://www.janisian.com/article-internet_debacle.html [hereinafter “Ian Article”]. 
 96 Neil Netanel is currently a professor at U.C.L.A. His biography is available at 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/home/index.asp?page=637 (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). 
 97 See Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 43-44 (2003) (discussing which products should be taxed under 
a noncommercial use levy). 
 98 Glynn Lunney is currently a professor at Tulane University, his biography is available at 
http://www.law.tulane.edu/tuexp/facadmin/biotemplate.cfm?username=glunney&status=faculty 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006). 
 99 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 852-53 (2001). 
 100 LESSIG, supra note 82, at 300-04. 
 101 Electronic Frontier Foundation, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of 
Music File Sharing (Feb. 2004), available at http:// www.eff.org/share/collective_lic_wp.pdf. 
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All of these solutions involving taxes and levies suffer from two 
major shortfalls.  First, taxes or levies on goods and services that can 
be used for file sharing seem inappropriate, because those who pur-
chase those goods or services but do not engage in file sharing, are 
forced to subsidize those who do.102  The second problem with these 
solutions is the redistribution mechanism.  Whenever a tax or levy is 
involved, someone is going to have to calculate percentages of wealth 
and redistribute that income to artists.  How should it be calculated 
fairly?  What if artists wish to opt out of the system?  What if P2P 
technology designers opt out?  Artists and the public would trade the 
costs of publishing music for the costs of keeping track of it.  Such a 
system, on a scale of millions (or possibly billions) of downloads may 
become prohibitively expensive. 
Perhaps the best solution is to accept the fact that noncommercial 
P2P file sharing is here to stay.  It is ubiquitous; it is growing, and it is, 
to a large extent, impossible to regulate.  The IITF’s “Celestial Juke-
box” already exists, but no one is paying for it, and in all likelihood no 
one ever will.  Why are we concerned about denying the public, the 
beneficiaries of the Copyright Clause, access to the works of artists, 
the other beneficiaries of the Copyright Clause, when it is self evident 
that this denial of access does not financially benefit the vast majority 
of artists and will hamper our best tools for the dissemination of exist-
ing works?  
In short, maybe it would be best if we just “leave them kids 
alone.” 
III.   INFRINGEMENT: PROTECTING THE “MILKMEN OF THE DIGITAL 
AGE” 
A milkman is a person . . . who delivers milk in milk bottles 
or cartons . . . .  Originally, milk needed to be delivered to 
houses on a daily basis as poor refrigeration meant it would 
quickly spoil.  The near-ubiquity of refrigerators in homes in 
the developed world has decreased the need for frequent 
milk delivery over the past half-century and made the pro-
                                                                                                                           
 102 Licensing ideas like the one proposed by the EFF have not gotten a warm reception 
from industry insiders. RIAA vice president of government relations, David Sutphen, points out 
two problems in the voluntary licensing scheme: first, users who agree to the licensing scheme 
wind up subsidizing sharing by users who simply continue to participate in free downloading, and 
second, the system essentially equalizes the value of all recorded music. Such a system, according 
to Sutphen, “means that ‘Ice Ice Baby’ has as much value as the Beatles catalog does.”  Lindsay 
Martell, A License to Share: Group Proposes Music Licensing Scheme for Music File Networks, 
ABCNEWS.COM, March 1, 2004, at 
http://www.g4tv.com/techtvvault/features/47196/A_License_to_Download.html.  
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fession shrink in many localities and disappear totally in 
others.  Additionally, milk delivery incurs a small cost on the 
price of dairy products that is increasingly difficult to justify 
. . . .103 
There was a time when it made sense to have milkmen, they were 
a spoke in the wheel of a dairy distribution system for which there was 
no viable alternative.  But as refrigeration technology improved, the 
need for milkmen waned, and once that need disappeared, the occu-
pation soon followed.  The parallel of the milkman in our digital age is 
the record label.  At the time of the 1976 Copyright Act, there was no 
such thing as “online,” let alone an “online music distribution me-
chanism.”  It seemed logical to focus infringement law, at least with 
respect to music, or “phonorecords,” as they are referred to by the 
statute,104 around a business model which contemplated not only the 
cost incurred by an artist in creating music but the cost incurred by a 
publisher in distributing it.  
In fact, the more closely one examines the history of copyright 
law and the doctrine in its modern form, the more one sees that this 
law, from its earliest roots, was designed to address the commercial 
interests associated with publishing.  What happens, however, when 
existing copyright law comes into conflict with the “culture of free”? 
Are the provisions of the 1976 Act adequately written to deal with the 
realities of online file sharing?  Or do the protections given to copy-
right holders under the 1976 Act really amount to a law that says we 
have to use milkmen? 
A.  A Brief History of Copyright 
In order to understand why copyright law is the way that it is and 
how it could be understood differently in a P2P environment, it is im-
portant to get a sense of its history.  From the printing press to the 
VCR, copyright law has always been forced to change in response to 
                                                                                                                           
 103 Wikipedia, Milkman, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milkman (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
The original record label-milkman analogy was made by author Matt Bai.  Matt Bai, Hating 
Hillary, WIRED MAG. (Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.02/hating_pr.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). 
 104 The 1976 Copyright Act states that: 
 
‘Phonorecords’ are material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying 
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or 
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term 
“phonorecords” includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.   
 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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new methods of creation and dissemination, and throughout the histo-
ry of copyright law, publishers’ interests and artists’ interest have been 
essentially aligned; artists, in order to disseminate their work, needed 
publishers, and publishers, in order to have work to disseminate, 
needed artists.  
The needs of artists and publishers, however, are not the only 
needs enshrined in copyright’s history; in fact, they are not even the 
primary needs, the primary beneficiary of copyright law has always 
been the public interest.  Under the old model, the public’s interest, 
artist’s interest, and publisher’s interest aligned under a model that 
used copyright terms in order to guarantee a large enough return on a 
publisher’s investment to justify its risk in selecting an artist’s material 
and disseminating it to the public.  Under our new model, where the 
publisher’s importance is vastly decreased because self-publishing by 
artists is cheap and easy, historically sensible incentive schemes may 
no longer be necessary. 
1. The roots of copyright 
Although the roots of our modern statutory copyright law are 
English, there are conceptual antecedents dating back much further.105  
Jewish law, for instance, provides one of the first example of law that 
could be regarded as protecting what we now know as the “public 
domain,” by “endors[ing] and even command[ing] the faithful repro-
duction of scriptural and other texts.”106  This was seen as necessary 
because these texts were a primary source of Jewish law, and the dis-
tribution of Jews throughout the world made it necessary to have 
faithful reproductions in order to disseminate them to the population 
and preserve them over a long period.107  Jewish law demanded two 
things of those who would copy texts; it required that the texts be co-
pied faithfully, and it required attribution to the original author.108 
The earliest account of a copyright “case” comes from Ireland.109  
A monk named Columba110 visited his former instructor, Finnian, at a 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Dallon, supra note 2, at 369-402 (discussing historical antecedents to English and 
American copyright law). 
 106 Id. at 372. 
 107 Id.; see generally MAX I. DIMONT, JEWS, GOD AND HISTORY (1962) (discussing Jewish 
Diaspora and survival over the culture’s 4,000-year history). 
 108 See Dallon, supra note 3, at 372-73. 
 109 There is no surviving record, but the story is recounted in CHARLES FORBES 
MONTALEMBERT, SAINT COLUMBA: APOSTLE OF CALEDONIA 18-21 (1898). 
 110 “Columba” would later become “Saint Columba,” a seminal figure in Irish history and 
folklore. See generally id; Wikipedia, Saint Columba, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saint_Columba 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
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monastery, and secretly copied a psalter.111  When Finnian learned of 
this, he demanded that Columba give him the copy.112  Columba re-
fused, and the case was brought before the King.113  The King sided 
with Finnian, holding “[t]o every cow her calf, and consequently to 
every book its copy.”114  The King, looking at whether “one in rightful 
possession of a manuscript ha[d] the right to copy it without permis-
sion of the manuscript’s owner,” answered “No.”115 
In spite of these early antecedents, what really drove the creation 
of what we now know as copyright law was the invention of the print-
ing press, which broke through the logistical concerns previously pre-
sented by copying manuscripts by hand.116  Gutenberg developed the 
first printing press in Mainz, Germany around 1450 and published the 
first printed book, the Gutenberg Bible,117 in 1455 or early 1456.118  The 
printing press allowed the production and dissemination of literature 
on a never-before seen scale.  Thousands who previously were unable 
to access any sort of literature because the cost involved in hand-
copying it made it prohibitively expensive could now afford such 
works.  
The printing press also placed economic pressure on a new and 
powerful class of tradesmen, the publishers.119  The prospect of “pub-
lishing” a manuscript on any scale was an expensive one because it 
involved a significant initial outlay for typesetting, raw materials, dis-
tribution and other costs associated with manufacturing books.120  A 
major concern among publishers was that a second publisher could 
buy a single copy of an initial publisher’s book, use his own press, print 
a similar copy, and render the initial publisher (and potentially, the 
second publisher) unable to recoup his investment.121 On the other 
hand, the public benefit incurred by society from the broad dissemina-
                                                                                                                           
 111 MONTALEMBERT, supra note 109, at 18.  A “psalter” is “a book containing the psalms 
separately printed or esp[ecially] arranged for liturgical or devotional use . . . .”  2 WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1829 (1986). 
 112 Id. at 18. 
 113 Id. at 18-19. 
 114 Id. at 21. 
 115 Dallon, supra note 2, at 376. 
 116 Id. at 378. 
 117 For an overview of the Gutenberg Bible, which includes background on the invention of 
the printing press and scans of the actual text of two editions of the original book, see Gutenberg 
Bible: View the British Library’s Digital Versions Online, 
http://www.bl.uk/treasures/gutenberg/homepage.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
 118 See N.F. BLAKE, CAXTON: ENGLAND’S FIRST PUBLISHER 4 (1976). 
 119 See Dallon, supra note 2, at 381 (noting that printers, “[b]y nature of the business, they 
tended to be educated and well connected.”). 
 120 See id. (noting that printers would need “substantial financial backing to afford the 
capital investment required to obtain and maintain a printing press and run a business.”).  
 121 Id. at 382.  
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tion of these published books was enormous.122  Clearly, the printing of 
books was an interest that was worthy of some kind of legal protec-
tion. 
It was with both of these concerns in mind that governments soon 
began to protect the interests of publishers by granting “specific privi-
leges . . . to particular publishers for particular works and usually for 
limited times.”123  This grant amounted to a narrow monopoly, which 
put printers in a position where they could safely recoup their invest-
ments for a particular work without fear of piracy.124  Some licenses 
also began to be granted to authors, giving them the right to choose 
which printer would be authorized to print their work.125  The “prin-
ter’s license” was essentially an ad hoc arrangement, which soon be-
gan to present problems because over time, the licenses began to con-
flict with one another.126  Governments began moving toward a more 
comprehensive solution to protecting the interests of authors and the 
expenses incurred by printers.  Statutes became necessary. 
2. Statutory copyright In England 
The modern statutory precursor to our current copyright law is 
the Statute of Anne, which was enacted by the British Parliament in 
1710.127  The purpose of the Statute was to promote the encouragement 
of learning, and the method by which this purpose was achieved was 
by granting authors limited property rights over the printing of their 
books.128  The failure to grant these limited monopolies, as claimed by 
                                                                                                                           
 122 This is the genesis of the “public benefit” rationale.  Public access to printed works was 
enabled by mass dissemination, which in turn was enabled by the printing press, which in turn 
was arguably responsible for the renaissance and the protestant reformation. See generally 
EISENSTEIN, supra note 20. 
 123 Dallon, supra note 2, at 383. 
 124 See id. at 382. 
 125 See id. at 383-84 (describing an exclusive right granted by Venetian authorities to the 
author Marcus Antonius Sabellicus to authorize a printing of his history of Venice; this is argua-
bly the first such right granted to an author). 
 126 The government in Venice: 
 
granted numerous privileges but some were conflicting or ambiguous. One privilege 
was granted but identified neither the protected title nor author. Other privileges 
were obtained in bad faith – where the privilege holder had no intention of publish-
ing the work, but rather intended to extract payment for the rights, or simply in-
tended to prevent others from publishing the work. 
 
Id. at 385-86 (footnote omitted). 
 127 LESSIG, supra note 82, at 86. 
 128 The statute’s preamble spells out these goals unmistakably. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 
Ann., c. 18 (Eng.), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html. 
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English author Daniel Defoe,129 would result in “a Discouragement to 
Industry, a Dishonour to Learning, and a Cheat upon the whole Na-
tion.”130  Although the Statute of Anne granted the limited monopoly 
that Defoe and his contemporaries pleaded for, it did so with signifi-
cant limitations.  The grant of monopoly under the Statute lasted, in 
the case of new works, for only 14 years.131  Another significant limita-
tion was the purpose of the act itself, which is enshrined in its charac-
terization by Parliament as “[a]n act for the encouragement of learn-
ing, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchas-
ers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”132  The “en-
couragement of learning” via the dissemination of works and encou-
ragement of new works was the foremost concern of British Parlia-
ment, not necessarily the property rights of the authors.133   
This distinction played itself out in the case of Donaldson v. 
Beckett, where the King’s Bench affirmed that the protections ex-
tended to authors under the Statute of Anne subsumed any copyrights 
which may have existed under common law before the Statute was 
passed.134  Similarly, in Newbery’s Case, the court held that an act of 
abridgment, where the defendant had abridged and published Haw-
kesworth’s novel Voyages, Newbury was not only exculpated from 
liability for copyright infringement but was congratulated for reducing 
the size of Hawkesworth’s novel and presenting it in a more readable 
fashion.135  This rule condoning “fair abridgment,” coupled with the 
rejection of a common law extension of the statutory monopoly 
granted to copyright holders, seemed to place the public’s interest in 
getting access to information in front of the author’s or publisher’s 
interest in having an exclusive right to his work.  
3. Constitutional copyright in the United States 
The United States Constitution is the basis of our understanding 
of copyright law.  It creates power in Congress to “To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Daniel Defoe is best known to history as the author of Robinson Crusoe. See Wikipedia, 
Daniel Dafoe, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Defoe (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
 130 Dallon, supra note 2, at 404. Note that this claim seems disingenuous on Defoe’s part. It 
does not appear that the lack of a law like the Statute of Anne discouraged him from becoming 
an author. 
 131 Statute of Anne, supra note 128. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Donaldson v. Beckett, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (K.B. 1774); see generally GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 6, at 38-40; LESSIG, supra note 82, at 92-94. 
 135 See Newbery’s Case, 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (Ch. 1773); see also John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair 
Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 479-480 (2005).  
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Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”136  Like the Statute of Anne, the delegates of the 
Constitutional convention created a law that represented a combina-
tion of a “purpose,” “to promote the progress of science and the use-
ful arts” and a “method,” which is to secure “for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”137  In The Federalist #43, James Madison stated that 
“[t]he utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright 
of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right 
of common law138. . . . The public good fully coincides . . . with the 
claims of individuals.”139 
Although this clause was approved unanimously, it actually 
represents an amalgamation of several clauses proposed by numerous 
delegates of the Constitutional Convention.140  The existing Copyright 
Clause was originally two clauses.141  One vested a power in Congress 
to “secure literary authors their copy rights for a limited time,” and 
the other vested a power to “encourage . . . the advancement of useful 
knowledge and discoveries,” to “grant patents for useful inventions,” 
and to “secure the inventors of useful machines and implement the 
benefits thereof for a limited time.”142  These goals, which relate to 
both copyrights and patents, were all combined for the purposes of 
Article I, section 8, clause 8.143   
In spite of their votes, many of the Founding Fathers were con-
cerned that the application of the Copyright Clause be balanced in 
order to achieve the maximum public benefit.  Madison shared his 
concerns about the monopolistic nature of copyright in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson, opining that monopolies “are justly classed among 
the greatest nusances [sic] in Government. But is it clear that as en-
couragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not 
too valuable to be wholly renounced?”144  Jefferson, in his letters, ex-
                                                                                                                           
 136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 137 Compare Statute of Anne, supra note 128, with U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 138 Madison is arguably incorrect on this point, as is indicated in Donaldson. See Donaldson, 
98 Eng. Rep. at 257 (holding that either (1) a perpetual common law copyright does not exist, or 
(2) the Statute of Anne superseded whatever common law protection authors had). 
 139 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 140 See I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS – SCIENCE IN THE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JEFFERSON, FRANKLIN, ADAMS, AND MADISON 239-40 (1995) (detail-
ing the underpinnings of the Copyright Clause and subsequent revisions thereof). 
 141 Id. at 240. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 1 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON 
AND JAMES MADISON 1776-1826, at 566 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995); see also Dallon, supra 
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pressed a dim view of the idea that the Constitution should intrinsical-
ly support grants of monopoly.145  Both, however, seemed to recognize 
that society could derive a great public benefit from authors and in-
ventors under a proper and balanced application of the Copyright 
Clause. 
Although the “public benefit rationale” was the clear underlying 
purpose of the Copyright Clause, scholars have proposed an alternate 
understanding, a “natural law” or “property rights” rationale,146 which 
is more in keeping with old Irish pronouncement of “to every cow her 
calf, and to every book its copy.”147  However, even the most ardent 
supporters of a “natural law” theory of copyright understood, at the 
time of the Constitutional Convention and for years beyond, that the 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution did not support their view of 
intellectual property rights.  Noah Webster,148 a staunch supporter of 
the “natural law” theory of copyright, reluctantly admitted that, since 
Donaldson, “it seems to have been generally admitted that an author 
has not a permanent and exclusive right to the publication of his orig-
inal works at common law.”149 
Congress enacted the first copyright statute in 1790, which was 
entitled “[a]n Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the 
copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of 
such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”150  Some commenta-
tors have suggested that, in spite of the clear language in the title of 
the Act, Congress merely thought it was giving statutory effect to an 
existing right.151  The Supreme Court, however, specifically rejected 
this assertion in Wheaton v. Peters,152 holding that any property rights 
of owners possessed to unpublished manuscripts under the common 
law were extinguished upon publication.153  After a manuscript was 
                                                                                                                           
note 3, at 424-25 (summarizing the correspondences between Madison and Jefferson involving 
copyright). 
 145 See id. at 425-26. 
 146 For more detailed explanations of the “natural law” theory of copyright, see generally 
Tehranian, supra note 135, at 481; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right In Self-Expression: Equali-
ty And Individualism In The Natural Law Theory of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 
(1993); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 517, 523-24 (1990). 
 147 MONTALEMBERT, supra note 109, at 21. See also discussion supra Part III(a). 
 148 Noah Webster is best-known by history as the man responsible for the creation of the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary. See Wikipedia, Noah Webster, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noah_Webster (last visited Mar. 10, 2006). 
 149 LETTERS OF NOAH WEBSTER 418 (Harry R. Warfel, ed., 1953). 
 150 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790), available at http://www.copyright.gov/his-
tory/1790act.pdf (emphasis added). 
 151 Dallon, supra note 2, at 427. 
 152 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). 
 153 Id. at 121-22. 
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published, the only protection afforded to the author and publisher 
was that provided by the Act.154   
The House Reports to revisions of the copyright statutes in 1909, 
and case law decided in the wake of the 1976 Act, continued to recog-
nize the “public benefit” as the principal rationale for the copyright 
privilege.155 The Supreme Court and the circuit courts of appeal con-
tinued to invoke this language in their opinions dealing with copyright 
issues.156  The first real philosophical shift in Congress’ thinking oc-
curred in 1998, with the passing of the CTEA, an amendment to the 
Copyright Act of 1976.157  The CTEA extended all of the time periods 
involved in copyright considerably,158 which arguably contradicts the 
“public purpose” rationale; but the real significance of the CTEA was 
the underlying reasoning involved.  For the first time, Congress seems 
to have recognized a “natural law” theory of copyright privilege over 
its constitutionally mandated and long-pedigreed “public purpose” 
rationale.159 
The Senate report on the passage of the CTEA discloses four 
main purposes for the passage of the act: (1) the harmonization of U.S. 
patents and copyrights with those in the EU, (2) the favorable impact 
this longer recognition would have on trade with other countries, (3) 
fairness to the authors, and (4) the stimulation of new works and the 
preservation of existing historical works.160  These final two justifica-
                                                                                                                           
 154 Id. 
 155 “The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitu-
tion is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the 
ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will 
be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.” 
H.R. Rep. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909), quoted in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 n.10 (1984); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 580 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222). 
 156 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (noting that the “difficult balance between the interests of 
authors and inventors [lies] in [protecting] the control and exploitation of their writings and 
discoveries on the one hand, and [protecting] society's competing interest in the free flow of 
ideas, information, and commerce on the other. . . .”). 
 157 CTEA, 112 Stat. at 2827. 
 158 See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 2-3 (1996).  The CTEA: 
 
amended the Copyright Act of 1976 . . . by extending the duration of existing and fu-
ture copyrights by twenty years. The term of copyright for new works generally went 
from the life of the author plus fifty years, to the life of the author plus seventy years. 
The term of copyrights for works made for hire was also increased by twenty years, 
resulting in a term of the shorter of ninety-five years from publication or 120 years 
from creation.  
 
Dallon, supra note 2, at 437 (footnotes omitted). 
 159 Id. 
 160 See S. REP. NO. 104-315 at 3. 
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tions are most concerning for proponents of the “public purpose” ra-
tionale of copyright, and are indicative of an overall paradigm shift in 
Congressional attitudes towards copyright in general. 
The “fairness” argument is clearly (and mistakenly) rooted in a 
“natural law” theory of copyright.  In spite of the official statement by 
Congress that its understanding of the term “limited times” requires it 
to ensure that copyright holders should be allowed to pass their copy-
rights down through at least one if not two generations of descen-
dants,161 Professor Dallon rightly observes that: 
American copyright law has never attempted to ensure 
copyright protection to benefit the author and two full gen-
erations of the author’s descendents. The concept of ensur-
ing protection for an author’s grandchildren is literally for-
eign to American copyright law and ironically was imported 
from the European Union Directive from 1993.  Significant-
ly, continental European copyright law has a different theo-
retical basis than American copyright law; continental Eu-
ropean copyright law is premised on the natural law proper-
ty right theory of copyright rather than a utilitarian public 
benefit theory. The natural law or property right theory 
supports a different balancing of interests than does the 
public benefit theory and supports very long—even perpe-
tual—copyright terms.162 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See id. at 10-11. This reasoning is even criticized within the Senate Report itself. Senator 
Brown notes that: 
 
[t]he phrase ‘‘limited times’’ has never been defined by the courts.  Both the Register 
of Copyrights and the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks argue that life-plus-
70 years is a limited time.  The Register of Copyrights suggests it is within the discre-
tion of Congress to determine what constitutes a limited time.  We do have an idea of 
what ‘‘limited times’’ meant to the drafters of the Constitution: the original grants of 
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The length of the term is so long that it invites a court review. 
 
Id. at 33.  The Senator also posits that: 
 
[t]he real incentive . . . is for corporate owners that bought copyrights to lobby Con-
gress for another 20 years of revenue—not for creators who will be long dead once 
this term extension takes hold.  Do you know any creator that would fail to create if 
the monopoly grant ran out at life-plus-50 years of protection rather than life-plus-70 
years?  Would Hemingway have produced another work if he were guaranteed 
another 20 years of copyright protection?  Would Wyeth have painted more?  Would 
Sinatra have sang more?  This suggestion is ludicrous. 
 
Id. at 32. 
 162 Dallon, supra note 2, at 443-44 (footnotes omitted). 
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The argument that an extension of copyright terms would stimu-
late the production of new works and preserve existing works is also 
based on a set of mistaken premises.  The first part of this argument 
assumes that the sole motivation for creating expressive works is in-
come.163  Even if generating income is a primary motivation for the 
artist, it seems unlikely that an extension of copyright to 70 years after 
his death would provide an incentive to create more or better works 
than he would have otherwise.164  The second part of this argument is 
also countermanded by experience dating back to Jewish law showing 
that works may be better preserved by copying them as much as poss-
ible, or at least without restraint.165  In short, at least two of the premis-
es upon which the CTEA is based seem to derogate the “public bene-
fit” rationale envisioned by the Founding Fathers and enshrined in the 
Copyright Clause.  The public is hardly served by allowing copyright 
holders to hoard their works from the public for longer than neces-
sary. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ratified Congress’s reasoning in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft.166  Applying a rational basis test to Congress’s ex-
tension of copyright terms, the Court held that “it is generally for 
Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright 
Clause’s objectives.”167  As a result of this ruling, Congress has for the 
most part been left to its own devices.  Congress gets to decide for 
itself what the Copyright Clause means, and needs only provide some 
rational reason for any modification it makes to existing copyright 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See discussion infra Part III(b). 
 164 See S. Rep. No. 104-315 at 33. 
 165 “Endorsing and commanding faithful copying of texts” was one way the Judaism has 
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[w]hatever work is not owned is a work that no one protects and preserves. . . . There 
is no one who will invest the funds for enhancement because there is no longer an 
incentive to rehabilitate and preserve something that anyone can offer for sale.  A 
public domain work is an orphan.  No one is responsible for its life.  But everyone 
exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of 
its previous virtues.  How does a consumer benefit from the steady decline of a film's 
quality? 
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ably reprinted and marketed in spite of the fact that these works can be exploited by anyone. 
 166 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 167 Id. at 212. 
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law.168  If Congress chooses to adopt a “natural law” theory that pro-
motes the private interests of artists over the public interest in having 
access to useful works, there is little, from a constitutional standpoint, 
that any court can do to stop it.  It is important to note that choosing 
to apply this test was not necessarily a mistake by the Supreme Court.  
The Court saw this as a simple case of how much it should infringe on 
a power constitutionally given to Congress, and chose to apply a stan-
dard of rational review that is frequently applied in the case of Article 
I powers.169  The issue, however, is how Eldred affects the underlying 
premise that copyright protections are intended primarily for the 
“public benefit” and not primarily for the “private benefit” of the art-
ist. 
All of this leaves us with two important points.  First of all, copy-
right law was developed primarily to meet the needs of printers, pub-
lishers and distributors.  Whether this is because governments were 
interested in the idealistic goal of having a ready supply of books 
available for their citizens, or the more sinister goal of controlling 
what books citizens would ultimately be able to read, one thing is 
clear: the benefits provided, historically, were not just designed to 
compensate artists, they were provided so that artists would be able to 
persuade publishers to make a capital investment with a government-
endorsed monopoly. 
The second major point is narrower.  The Copyright Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution is, like the rest of that document, designed to be self-
limiting.  In the United States, the government-endorsed monopoly 
power is (or should be) only as good as the expressive creation it in-
centivizes.  Where the monopoly is not incentivizing creation and dis-
semination or where the monopoly is disincentivizing creation and 
dissemination, this may even suggest that even under an Eldred stan-
dard, the grant of monopoly is irrational.  This understanding is consis-
tent with the understanding of the Founding Fathers.  
                                                                                                                           
 168 In the Senate Reports on the CTEA, Congress elaborated on its four principal justifica-
tions, stating that: 
 
[t]he question of exactly what term of protection most appropriately reflects a ‘‘li-
mited time’’ as envisioned by the Founders has been debated since the enactment of 
the first Copyright Act in 1790, and is likely to continue to be debated into the fore-
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 169 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208 (declaring that once “we find that the CTEA is a rational enact-
ment; we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments 
of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”). 
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The Copyright Clause is designed to primarily benefit the public, 
followed, in a limited sense, by the artists.  Copyright holders like 
record companies were important beneficiaries who were worth pro-
tecting when they served the public interest by disseminating music to 
the public, but like milkmen, their importance has waned with the ad-
vent of P2P file sharing.  Now, instead of being a necessary spoke in a 
music distribution system, they stand in its way, waving copyrights that 
were designed for a pre-P2P world and litigating furiously against 
those who recognize their irrelevance. 
B.  Commercial Copying: The Heart of Infringement 
As was discussed in the previous section, copyright law, at its his-
torical core, is rooted in the commercial interest of publishing. What 
makes P2P file sharing unique in the history of copyright law is not 
only its ability to copy, but its ability to disseminate without the need 
for any kind of publishing.  The historical record demonstrates that a 
major focus of copyright law from its inception has been to protect the 
interests of publishers, because the protection of those interests was 
the surest route to dissemination.  In the digital age, there is, for the 
first time, no significant cost associated with dissemination; and the 
job that used to belong to a publishing house now belongs to every 
person who uploads and downloads music.  In effect, the needs of art-
ists, the public, and the publishers are no longer really aligned because 
publishers impose what amounts to a surplus cost on music recordings 
that is no longer needed to ensure dissemination. 
The 1976 Act takes very well-defined and comprehensive steps to 
prevent commercial piracy of “phonorecordings,”170 but it is important 
to remember that the environment we are in now is one that was not 
contemplated by the drafters of the act in 1976.  At that time, it was 
probably assumed that almost all piracy would have an inherently 
commercial character.  After all, who would go through the time and 
effort of pressing and packaging an album in order to just give it away 
to people?  Naturally, this behavior didn’t really make sense in a non-
digital environment, so it was probably not foremost on the minds of 
the drafters of the 1976 Act. 
This emphasis on underlying commerciality receives support 
from several sources in the 1976 Act, which provides a number of ex-
ceptions to infringement based on uses that are private and not strictly 
commercial.171 Often uses made for what is considered a “public” pur-
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pose, such as library-based copying, are not considered infringing.172  
An excellent example of this kind of exception-making is section 
602(a)(2) of the 1976 Act, which dictates that: 
importation, for the private use of the importer and not for 
distribution, by any person with respect to no more than 
one copy or phonorecord of any one work at any one time, 
or by any person arriving from outside the United States 
with respect to copies or phonorecords forming part of such 
person’s personal baggage. . . . is not an act of infringe-
ment.173 
This has two significant effects in a P2P file-sharing context. First, 
what if the party offering the upload is international?  Doesn’t that 
relieve the downloading party, who is downloading “no more than one 
copy . . . of any one work at any one time[,]” from liability under the 
exception?  Is downloading importation within the meaning of the 
copyright clause?  There is no case law on this point, but it would cer-
tainly seem plausible. 
The second effect is on direct sites that offer music for download, 
like Allofmp3.com, and its different-in-name-only descendant, 
Mp3Sparks.com.174  Allofmp3.com operated in a “grey area” with re-
spect to the legitimacy of its service to Russian downloaders.175  The 
owners of the site claimed ownership of their files by virtue of the fact 
that Russian copyright law gave them the right, as owners of Russian 
radio stations, to “broadcast” their music on the Web and through ra-
dio waves.176  Russian authorities said the service provided by the 
company is illegal, and eventually shut down Allofmp3.com.177 The 
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service charged roughly a penny a megabyte to download copies of 
popular artists from the United States and Europe.178  Naturally, it is 
unclear whether any part of that cost was distributed to copyright 
holders, since the site existed in Russia, but it was (and is) likely that 
Allofmp3.com (and, for that matter, Mp3Sparks.com) is just working 
within the confines of a compulsory licensing system very different 
from our own.  Once again, does the “importation exception” make 
downloading “no more than one copy. . . of any one work at any one 
time” legal under our 1976 concepts of infringement?179  It would cer-
tainly seem so. 
There are really only two possible conclusions that can be drawn 
from the presence of section 602(a)(2) in the Copyright Act: either (1) 
the Act is simply not that concerned about private noncommercial 
importation of music, or (2) the writers of the Act did not really con-
sider the impact of a large scale, online importation system, and there-
fore they did not deal with it.  In either sense, it would seem that the 
Copyright Act of 1976 is ill-equipped to deal with the realities of the 
file-sharing controversy. 
Another example of the Act’s deficiencies is the statutory penalty 
imposed for infringement. The Copyright Act gives copyright holders 
the option to recover actual damages plus defendant’s profits made by 
an infringer, or forego those damages in favor of statutory damages.  
One would assume that a need for statutory damages would arise 
where actual damages were difficult or impossible to prove, but they 
are unfortunately available, like an unconscionable liquidated damag-
es clause, where little or no actual damages have occurred. 
Section 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act guarantees statutory dam-
ages, should a plaintiff elect them, of “a sum of not less than $750 or 
more than $30,000 as the court considers just.”  Consider the amount 
of actual damages that may exist with respect to the downloading of a 
single CD: $15.99 per CD, divided across 13 songs on that CD, is about 
$1.23 per song.  Allowing the plaintiff to elect statutory damages of 
$750 per song or per album, when actual damages could easily be cal-
culated at somewhere between $1.23 and $15.99, seems excessive.  
Even under Eldred’s rational review standard, these damages may not 
survive.  One argument in favor of these large statutory penalties 
might be that they act as deterrents, but if the effect of a deterrent is 
to force a beneficiary of the copyright clause, the public, to pay an ex-
tra amount of money which is not ultimately going to wind up in the 
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hands of the artist, aren’t we really asking the public, via the statutory 
penalty, to subsidize an outmoded means of production? 
The existence of the a statutory penalty of this magnitude forces 
us to consider two possible conclusions: Perhaps the size of the dam-
age provision is due to the fact that it was designed primarily to deter 
commercial pirates, therefore it would not be applicable to a non-
commercial downloader; or perhaps Congress simply did not antic-
ipate how the Act would function in a digital culture, and therefore 
the act is ill-equipped to deal with these questions.  In either case, 
there is evidence within the Copyright Act itself that allows us to con-
clude that its statutory provisions may not be the best guide to inter-
preting copyright law, perhaps it would be better to rely on the under-
lying policies of copyright law to guide our conclusions. 
C.  The Beneficiaries that Weren’t: Artists and the Public 
As noted above, the Constitution is the root of our copyright, and 
the Copyright Clause itself neatly demonstrates that the copyright 
holder’s statutory monopoly is granted in order “to promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts.”180 The clause therefore demon-
strates a “purpose” of promoting progress and a “method” of granting 
copyrights for limited times.181  The main problem with the “natural 
law” theory of copyright, which seems to have been adopted by Con-
gress in the passing of the CTEA,182 is that it confuses the purpose with 
the method.  The statutory monopoly is not an end in and of itself.  It 
is a means of encouraging creation by artists and dissemination by 
(until now) publishers. 
There are really only two ways to promote the “progress” of the 
useful arts in a manner that benefits society: works must be created 
and works must be broadly disseminated.  These goals seem antitheti-
cal, after all, the best way to maximize dissemination would be to 
make all works available for free, while theoretically, the best way to 
maximize the incentive for creation would be to protect works in per-
petuity.183  It is important, however, to remember that the Founding 
Fathers did not care for monopolies in general, and at least some of 
them had their reservations about a government-backed statutory 
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monopoly for copyright holders.184  But the Copyright Clause was ul-
timately approved because the Founding Fathers thought that the 
monopoly would be used for the public benefit. 
Looking at the current state of the record industry, the concerns 
of the Founding Fathers seem (pardon the pun) well-founded. This 
industry has had every kind of consumer complaint lodged against it 
over the years: including widespread payola scandals,185 and antitrust 
litigation for, among other things, fixing the price of CDs in order to 
charge the public an unfair rate.186  It is clear that the record industry 
does not exactly act, of its own accord, with the best interests of its 
public at heart.  At the other end of the spectrum, artists have com-
plained about the unfair nature of recording contracts for years.187  
Even the standard industry contract hardly puts the artist at any kind 
of advantage right out of the gate.188  In the words of artist Courtney 
Love: 
[s]omewhere along the way, record companies figured out 
that it's a lot more profitable to control the distribution sys-
tem than it is to nurture artists.  And since the companies 
didn't have any real competition, artists had no other place 
to go.  Record companies controlled the promotion and 
marketing; only they had the ability to get lots of radio play, 
and get records into all the big chain store[s].  That power 
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put them above both the artists and the audience.  They own 
the plantation.189  
Artist Janis Ian puts this problem into a more personal perspec-
tive, pointing out that “in 37 years as a recording artist, I've created 
25+ albums for major labels, and I've never once received a royalty 
check that didn't show I owed them money.”190 
This is the price that the public and the artist pays for an “old-
style” physical dissemination network.  It is a price that is too high in 
an environment where the primary function of the record label is no 
longer necessary.  Of course, it is not up to the courts to change the 
statutes.  Under the United States Supreme Court’s precedent in El-
dred, courts can only subject congressional interpretations of the Cop-
yright Clause like the 1976 Act to “rational review.”  While this level 
of review may be enough to overturn the excessive penalties provided 
by the Act, it is doubtful the court will adopt a new meaning of what 
constitutes infringement in the digital environment. 
IV.   FAIR USE: INCENTIVES, ACCESS, AND THAT SILLY OLD 
CONSTITUTION 
Fortunately, interpretations of the copyright clause are not left 
completely to the whims of Congress.  Courts, over time, have devel-
oped the doctrine of “fair use” to undo the harshness of the statutory 
copyright regime when necessary.  Principally defined as a “privilege 
in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted materi-
al in a reasonable manner without consent, notwithstanding the mo-
nopoly granted to the owner[,]”191 this doctrine has co-evolved with 
copyright doctrine over time.  As new technologies have emerged, fair 
use has been allowed to evolve—as a defense to a copyright infringe-
ment claim—to encompass the use of technologies in a manner bene-
ficial to society at large. 
A.  Historical Precursors to Fair Use 
Historical antecedents constituting what could be termed as a fair 
use argument go as far back as medieval Ireland.  Although no official 
record exists in the matter of Finnian v. Columba, historians have 
noted that Columba’s defense to Finnian’s claim that he had made an 
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unauthorized copy of his old master’s psalter was essentially that such 
copying should be considered a fair use.192  Columba pointed out that: 
Finnian’s book has not decreased in value because of the 
transcript I made from it; also that it is not right to extin-
guish the divine things it contained, or to prevent me or an-
ybody else from copying it, or reading it, or circulating it 
throughout the provinces.  I further maintain that if I bene-
fited by its transcription, which I desired to be for the gen-
eral good, provided no injury accrued to Finnian or his book 
thereby, it was quite permissible for me to copy it!193 
“Fair use” also figured prominently in English interpretations of 
the Statute of Anne.  Both Newbery’s Case and Donaldson v. Beckett 
illustrated the English Courts’ willingness to get involved in balancing 
the public benefit provided by a work with the harshness of the copy-
right statute.  The rule under English common law was called the “fair 
abridgment” rule, and, not surprisingly, it applied to abridgments only, 
which were seen as enhancing the public benefit offered by a particu-
lar work.194 
The American doctrine of fair use emerged in the case of Folsom 
v. Marsh.195   In Folsom, the defendant, writing a biography of George 
Washington, used a number of previously unpublished letters the 
plaintiff had procured and published in his own biography of the late 
president.196  The defendant did not engage in verbatim copying of the 
plaintiff’s novel; he merely used the letters as “ingredients” in his own 
work, which Justice Story characterized as “an exceedingly valuable 
book.”197  Ultimately, the court set forth a set of criteria that would be 
used to decide whether a “fair use” should be applied to a given case 
in the future, stating that: 
[i]n short, we must often . . . look to the nature and objects 
of the selections made, the quantity and value of the mate-
rials used, and the degree to which the use may prejudice 
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of 
the original work . . . .198 
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This statement represents the foundation of the “four factors” that 
courts will look to in determining whether there is a fair use defense 
to a copyright infringement claim.199 
In spite of the fact that Justice Story laid out the fundamentals of 
fair use in Folsom, a number of scholars have claimed that he engaged 
in what amounted to a “natural law” interpretation of copyright which 
was not supported by the history of “fair abridgment” or the underly-
ing “public benefit” of the copyright clause.200 Justice Story, in his hold-
ing, noted prominently that “"[t]he entirety of the copyright is the 
property of the author; and it is no defense, that another person has 
appropriated a part, and not the whole, of any property.”201  Justice 
Story showed little regard for the public benefit that could be derived 
from the defendant’s copying of the plaintiff’s work.  By emphasizing 
the property rights and limiting the application of fair use to what 
could be termed only as a “productive use,” Justice Story went against 
the venerable English common law tradition that served as the basis 
of the Constitutional Copyright Clause.  Professor Tehranian notes 
that “Story’s legal analysis shows little regard for the potential benefit 
that dissemination of the allegedly infringing work may have for so-
ciety[,]” which, if one takes the Copyright Clause seriously, should be 
a fundamental consideration in any analysis of fair use.202  In spite of 
these scholarly criticisms of the Court’s analysis in Folsom, the fair use 
rationale set forth by Justice Story has been consistently applied and 
expounded upon in future cases and in future congressional acts. 
B.  Noncommercial Activity: Fair Use under the 1976 Act 
The factors listed by the court in Folsom have been codified by 
Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976.203  Congress set forth four fac-
tors that must all be considered by the court in the adoption of a fair 
use defense:  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) 
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the . . . work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
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upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.204   
These four factors were not intended by Congress to be exclusive, 
and courts have been given license to consider any other factors they 
may deem relevant on a case-by-case basis.205  The House reports on 
the legislative history of the fair use codification demonstrate that 
Congress did not intend to “freeze” the doctrine of “fair use,” but 
merely intended to promulgate a set of guidelines for the courts to 
follow in their interpretations.206 
In its preamble, the Act gives several examples of uses that could 
be considered “fair” by the courts, including “criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research . . . .”207  The examples listed by Congress are 
purposefully broad, and are by no means meant to be the outer limits 
of what uses could be considered “fair.”  The uses set forth by Con-
gress in the preamble could all be considered “productive” or “trans-
formative” uses, where the individual using the copyright is “adding 
something” to the copyrighted work, as opposed to “reproductive” 
uses, in spite of the fact that the public can benefit just as much from 
“reproductive” uses as from “productive” uses.208 
1. The Purpose or Character of the Use 
This first factor principally focuses on the distinction between 
“commercial” and “non-commercial” uses and is designed to protect a 
copyrighted work from commercial exploitation by a non-copyright 
holder.209  Keeping with the Court’s interpretation in Folsom, however, 
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a commercial purpose does not completely render it impossible for the 
court to find a fair use defense, but “a court should not strain to apply 
a fair use defense when it is being invoked by a profit-making defen-
dant . . . .”210  For this reason, non-profit educational uses will generally 
create a presumption satisfying this factor, while uses that produce a 
profit for the non-copyright holder generally will not.211 
The “purpose or character” factor also addresses “bad faith” 
uses: 
where a defendant has knowingly exploited a stolen manu-
script or engaged in verbatim copying without any effort to 
obtain permission from the copyright owner or cite the cop-
yright owner as the source of the material.212 
A finding of “bad faith,” like a finding of “commercial purpose,” 
is not dispositive as to whether a use is ultimately fair.  It merely 
weighs for or against a defendant in conjunction with other factors 
found to be important by the court.213  In addition, the “purpose or 
character” factor addresses whether “comment and criticism” was a 
primary motivation for a use.214  “However, an individual in rebutting a 
copyrighted work containing derogatory information about himself 
may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to permit unders-
tandable comment.”215   
2. The nature of the copyrighted work 
When evaluating the nature of copyrighted works, courts are 
more likely to allow fair uses of material that is informative in nature 
than that which is expressive in nature, although, like any other factor, 
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a finding that a work is expressive will not completely eliminate a fair 
use defense.216  This factor could be characterized as an embodiment of 
the “public benefit” rationale, allowing wider uses for scientific, bio-
graphical or historical works than those which are purely expressive in 
nature than for those which are purely expressive, such as rock con-
certs.217  This factor also addresses a work’s accessibility to the public.218  
Where works are more accessible to the public, the need for fair use 
decreases, but where they are less accessible, the need for fair use is 
likely to increase.219 
3. The amount or substantiality of the portion used 
This factor, which is most often applied in relation to fair uses in-
volving comment and criticism, asks whether the non-copyright holder 
took more than the amount of a copyrighted work than he needed.220  
Where a non-copyright holding author has taken more of a copy-
righted work than he needs for his critical points, he will abrogate a 
defense under fair use.221 
Because it deals with “amount and substantiality,” this factor 
forces courts to evaluate the quality as well as the quantity of the 
work used by a non-copyright holder.222  Where an author, even 
through a small amount of copying, has essentially copied the essence 
of a copyrighted work, this factor will not be satisfied, even if the 
overall amount of the work copied is small in nature.223  The concern, 
which relates closely to the fourth factor,224 is that if a non-copyright 
holder engages in too much copying of a copyrighted work, the pub-
lic’s need for the copy may wind up displacing the need for the origi-
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copyrighted material,” are factors which should be evaluated together). 
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nal, undermining the “method” of achieving the public benefit pur-
pose cited under the copyright clause. 
4. Effect of the use on the potential market for, or value of, the 
work 
This factor examines whether a non-copyright holder’s use of a 
copyrighted product will have a substantial effect on the market for 
the original copyrighted work. The standard rationale for the fourth 
factor relates closely to that for the third, “[i]f the market for the cop-
yright owner’s work is harmed, the incentives for creativity that the 
copyright monopoly is designed to encourage will not work.”225 
This factor focuses both on the actual market harm caused by a 
defendant’s copying and on the potential harm a defendant’s copying 
could have on the market for the author’s copyrighted work.226  Courts 
consider not just the effect of an individual infringement on a given 
market (which would normally be quite small, especially where the 
use in question is a private use), but whether widespread conduct of 
the kind would wind up affecting the market negatively.227  Because of 
this “potential harm” rationale, courts are not obligated to consider 
whether a work has been marketed by a defendant or not.  The ambit 
of “potential market harm” enables copyright holders to prevent de-
fendants from claiming fair use by privately copying an author’s copy-
righted works.228  In order to defeat a defendant’s fair use claim under 
this factor, a plaintiff only needs to demonstrate that there is a “mea-
ningful likelihood of future harm.”229  A plaintiff does not need to 
show that he was actually harmed or would be harmed by a use in 
order to prevail against a defendant’s fair use claim.  In answering 
                                                                                                                           
 225 LEAFFER, supra note 212, at 478.  Notice that the rationale is stated in terms of copy-
right holders, not authors.  What if this rationale was not true?  Authors seemed perfectly willing 
to create works before copyright and they seem to be willing, even today, to create works in spite 
of the fact that financial rewards are extremely unlikely.  Certainly copyright holders would be 
harmed by these uses, but the constitutional question is (or should be) whether, in the end, the 
public would have access to less works. 
 226 The Copyright Act creates a ‘wide berth” for the “market harm” factor by expressly 
stating market harm in terms of potentiality. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).  Obviously, a showing 
of actual harm would, in itself, be conclusive as to whether there was potential harm, so it is safe 
to assume that actual harm would fall into the ambit of § 107(4).  Id. 
 227 Courts should “consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular 
actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the 
sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the poten-
tial market’ for the original.”  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
 228 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005) 
(finding “evidence of infringement on a gigantic scale” in spite of the fact that the evidence 
consisted of noncommercial copying by the service’s users); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming similar finding under a clear error standard). 
 229 LEAFFER, supra note 212, at 472. 
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whether there is a “meaningful likelihood of future harm,” courts 
generally address whether the market for the copy will significantly 
displace the market for the original.230 
Appling the “purpose/method” rationale to this factor, it appears 
that the argument looks like this: Authors are encouraged to create 
and seek to publish new expressive works by the guarantee of a statu-
tory monopoly under the Copyright Clause. The reason this monopoly 
is guaranteed is because the public derives a benefit from these new 
works.  Therefore, any works that infringe on the monopoly necessari-
ly infringe on the artist’s incentive to create.  This argument rests on 
two critical assumptions: (1) that authors create works principally for 
profit and (2) that the public benefit accrued by the wide use of exist-
ing works is somehow smaller than the public benefit accrued by the 
restriction of copying works.  The problem is that the industry itself 
has proven the first assumption wrong; artists routinely create proper-
ty that record companies are able to use to turn a substantial profit, 
but that profit does not find its way back to the artist.231  Somehow, this 
does not seem to disincentivize creation. The second assumption can 
be attacked on two points: (a) imposing a limitation on P2P distribu-
tion not only imposes a limitation on copyright, but on technology as 
well, and (b) the axis of the balance, if one considers that the Copy-
right Clause is essentially a grant of monopoly endorsed by the gov-
ernment, should be, at default, in favor of the public interest in disse-
mination.  
C.  Technology and Fair Use, the Push-Pull Relationship 
Courts have not adopted Congress’s rationale of “productive 
use” altogether in their interpretations of what does and does not con-
stitute a Fair use.  Often, the most divergent interpretations of fair 
uses come on the heels of new technologies, such as copying machines, 
videocassette recorders, or Internet file-sharing networks.  This section 
looks at each of those technologies in turn and examines how the 
court applied nontraditional methodologies to these uses in order to 
                                                                                                                           
 230 In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2002), the court notes that:  
 
Kelly's markets for his images include using them to attract advertisers and buyers to 
his web site, and selling or licensing the images to other web sites or stock photo da-
tabases. By giving users access to Kelly's full-sized images on its own web site, Arriba 
harms all of Kelly's markets. Users will no longer have to go to Kelly's web site to 
see the full-sized images, thereby deterring people from visiting his web site. 
 
Id. 
 231 See Albini, supra note 188. 
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balance the “purpose” and “method” proscribed under the Copyright 
Clause.   
1. The photocopier 
The first case in which the Supreme Court dealt with a fair use 
involving photocopying equipment was Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States.232  In that case, the U.S. Government, through its Nation-
al Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and its National Library of Medicine, 
photocopied and distributed articles from medical journals to anyone 
who made a request for them.233  In a number of cases, the circulation 
of the medical journals was low, meaning that those seeking the ar-
ticles did not have many practical alternative means of acquiring 
them.234  In spite of the fact that millions of pages had been photoco-
pied and it was probable that the photocopies of the articles had in-
evitably found their way into a number of commercial uses, the Su-
preme Court did not disturb a lower court holding that the govern-
ment’s use of these medical journals was fair because the plaintiff had 
failed to prove its future harm adequately.235  The court also noted that 
the dictionary definition of “copy” was inadequate to address the 
meaning of the word “copy” put forth under the Copyright Act of 
1909.236  The court also noted that since the invention of the photo-
copier, a culture had developed among libraries where photocopying 
articles had become accepted, and this culture, to the extent that it 
advanced knowledge, was beneficial to the public.237 
The courts seemed to scale back this rationale in American Geo-
physical Union v. Texaco (“Texaco”).238  The defendant in that case had 
a corporate policy of photocopying relevant journal articles from pe-
riodicals it purchased and storing them in a library for future use by its 
employees.239  Although there was no direct commercial advantage in 
                                                                                                                           
 232 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 487 F.2d 1345 (1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).  
One interesting aspect of this case is that the relevant statute was the Copyright Act of 1909, not 
1976.  Williams & Wilkins and its progeny seem to have wrought significant changes in the Copy-
right Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000).  Perhaps P2P file sharing will have the same effect 
on a future copyright act.  If so, decisions involving P2P file sharing are likely to have an impact 
on the act’s language. 
 233 Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1348.  The NIH did have a policy not to copy and distri-
bute journals that were part of its widely available list and not to honor excessive requests from 
any single institution, but these policies had exceptions. Id. at 1349. 
 234 See id. at 1356. 
 235 Id. at 1358. 
 236 Id. at 1351. 
 237 See id. at 1355-56. 
 238 American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); aff’d, 37 F.3d 881 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
 239 Texaco, 802 F. Supp. at 4-5. 
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the articles, the Second Circuit held that the defendant was not engag-
ing in fair use because it could easily have purchased additional jour-
nal subscriptions instead of photocopying the journals and storing 
them away.240  Even though the defendant argued that its use was for 
research and that the burden of the extra transaction costs imposed 
upon the defendant by having to purchase additional journals would 
outweigh the benefit of its research, the fact that the research con-
ducted by the defendant ultimately led to a commercial purpose was 
enough to hold it liable for infringement.241 
In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services,242 
the court held that a defendant could not take excerpts from copy-
righted books in order to profit, even when the purpose ultimately 
served was educational in nature.243  The facts in that case showed that 
the defendant, the owner of a small copy shop, was engaged in the 
business of creating “coursepacks” for professors at the University of 
Michigan.244  The defendant did not seek permission from the copy-
right owners to create these coursepacks.245  The court held that this 
copying was not a fair use because by copying those works for profit, 
the defendant was clearly competing in a market for the copyrighted 
works.246  This finding was made in spite of the fact that under the 
preamble language of the fair use doctrine as codified in section 108, 
the professors requesting these coursepacks could have gathered and 
copied the material on their own.247 
The photocopier cases are interesting because they present a 
clear “case study” of how the fair use doctrine can be used to protect 
certain uses of new technologies.  Photocopying law seems to have 
developed a “pattern” that courts should adopt for future technologi-
cal advances like P2P: a new technology was created; in a legal va-
cuum, a “culture” formed around the use of the technology; under the 
“fair use” doctrine, a jurisprudence was allowed to develop around the 
culture; the market adjusted.  This is a good way to create new doc-
trine without being overly restrictive or overly permissive. A second 
example exists with videocassette recorders. 
                                                                                                                           
 240 Id. at 19. 
 241 Id. at 29. 
 242 Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs.,
 
99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 243 Id. at 1389. 
 244 Id. at 1384. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 1387. 
 247 Id. at 1389. 
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2. The videocassette recorder 
In Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.248 the Supreme 
Court dealt principally with the issue of whether Sony, by creating and 
marketing a machine that was capable of copying television broad-
casts, was liable as a contributory infringer.249  Because the Supreme 
Court held that the manufacturer of a product that was being used to 
infringe could not be liable so long as its product was capable of “sub-
stantial noninfringing uses,” liability for contributory infringement 
rests implicitly on a finding of direct infringement by those using a 
product.  Therefore, the Court was forced to deal with the sub-issue of 
whether a product’s use constituted direct infringement.250  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Stevens held that the habit of “time shifting,” that 
is, of users recording programs to watch later on at their leisure, was 
indeed a fair use because non-commercial uses placed the burden on 
the plaintiff to demonstrate that they could suffer potential harm, and 
the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate that they suffered this 
harm.251  The defendant also proffered “library building” as a potential 
fair use, but the Supreme Court did not reach that question since it 
concluded (a) that the defendant’s product need only be capable of a 
single fair use for Sony to avoid liability, and (b) that “time shifting” 
was just such a fair use.252   
Sony is significant for a number of reasons. First, it represents an 
abrogation by the Supreme Court of the Congressional doctrine of 
“productive use” as a basis for fair use.253  The use by the directly-
infringing parties in Sony is purely reproductive in nature, lends a 
great deal of support to the holding in Williams & Wilkins that not all 
reproductive uses will necessarily be unfair.254  Second, Sony seems to 
                                                                                                                           
 248 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 249 Id. at 420. 
 250 Id. at 442. 
 251 See id. at 450-51 (noting that “a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential 
market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the 
author's incentive to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit 
access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.”). 
 252 Id. at 442. 
 253 Id. at 455 n.40 (noting that “[t]he distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" 
uses may be helpful in calibrating the balance[in a determination of whether a given use is fair], 
but it cannot be wholly determinative. Although copying to promote a scholarly endeavor cer-
tainly has a stronger claim to fair use than copying to avoid interrupting a poker game, the ques-
tion is not simply two-dimensional.”); see also id. at 478 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority’s rejection of the productive use standard). 
 254 Compare id. at 455 n.40, with Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 
(1973) (noting that “[i]t has sometimes been suggested that the copying of an entire copyrighted 
work . . . cannot ever be “fair use,” but this is an overbroad generalization, unsupported by the 
decisions and rejected by years of accepted practice.”). 
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imply a stronger presumption to private noncommercial uses, at least 
where the initial product is free.  No one argued in Sony that the en-
tire audience was engaged in an educational purpose.255  Indeed, the 
nature of the works in the majority of cases were clearly expressive, 
and not informational.256  In spite of that, the Court in the Sony ruled 
that there was no direct infringement done by time-shifting.257  
So where does this leave fair use?   It seems that the doctrine is 
suffering from divergent trends.  Sony and Williams & Wilkins seem to 
suggest that private noncommercial uses can be okay.258  Sony, in fact, 
seems to reach even farther because the vast majority of television 
programs are “expressive,” rather than “informative” works.259  Texaco 
and Princeton both seem to come down fairly hard on commercial 
uses, but it is important to remember that they do not really reach the 
question of whether those same uses would be okay in a noncommer-
cial sense.260   
In the file-sharing context, the difference seems to be one of 
scale.  The Ninth Circuit rejected the fair use arguments made by the 
defendants in Napster, but the deciding factor seemed to be the poten-
tial availability of the copyrighted material was something which ren-
dered the end-users’ approach unfair, especially in the context of Rio’s 
seeming ratification of the same “space shifting” argument made by 
the defendants in Napster.261 Grokster, however, could be seen as 
something more akin to direct commercial infringement.  The respon-
dent in that case clearly made a profitable use of others copyrighted 
material in spite of the fact that it never uploaded the material onto its 
                                                                                                                           
 255 See generally Sony, 464 U.S. 417. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 442. 
 258 See id (allowing noncommercial time shifting); Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1353 
(allowing noncommercial photocopying). 
 259 See Litman, supra note 15, at 24-25 (discussing the elusiveness of the distinction between 
information and expression and suggesting that the underlying arguments for distinguishing 
these two ultimately fail). 
 260 See Texaco, 802 F. Supp. 1 (holding that copying journal articles was not a fair use be-
cause Texaco was ultimately using their contents for a commercial purpose); Princeton Universi-
ty Press v. Michigan Document Services,
 
99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a business that 
produced “coursepacks” which included copyrighted material was unfairly profiting from other 
artists’ copyrights and thus was not engaged in a “fair use”). 
 261 Compare  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (find-
ing no merit in Napster’s “space shifting” argument), with Recording Industry Ass’n of America, 
Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that “[t]he 
Rio merely makes copies in order to render portable, or "space-shift," those files that already 
reside on a user's hard drive[]” and that “[s]uch copying is paradigmatic noncommercial person-
al use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act”). 
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website; the task of engaging in actual infringement was left to the 
users who inhabited the network.262 
There is another interesting aspect to consider when looking at 
the line of P2P cases in comparison to photocopying and videocassette 
recorder cases.  P2P cases seem, by necessity, to involve a  morass of 
infringement standards for contributory, vicarious, direct, and recently 
“inducement” liability.263  This extensive importation and use of stan-
dards that are not expressly mentioned in the Copyright Act strongly 
suggests that P2P technology has outstripped the statutory language.264  
Ordinarily, courts treading on what is clearly new ground would show 
great deference to Congress and the public’s interest in leaving new 
technologies unfettered, but unlike the courts in the photocopier and 
videocassette recorder cases, courts judging liability in P2P seem to 
have lost sight of the “public purpose” rationale and the idea that 
Congress should be the entity deciding how to deal with P2P.  Courts 
in P2P cases seem principally concerned with protecting of an im-
agined property right over the reproduction of published music.  Such 
an interpretation is not supported by history.265  Instead courts should 
police these new technologies carefully, with an eye towards maintain-
ing maximum dissemination and technological development while 
ensuring that enough is left to incentivize creation. 
D.  Reinstating the Public Benefit Rationale via The Fair Use Doctrine 
Modern interpretations of the Copyright Clause, in both a legisla-
tive and judicial sense, seem to suffer from two principal evils, confu-
sion and amnesia. The first evil is confusion between the “purpose,” 
achieving a public benefit, and the “method,” the granting of statutory 
monopolies.266  The second evil is amnesia regarding the underlying 
history of the copyright clause.267  Congress’s interpretation of copy-
rights, with the CTEA,268 and the courts’ interpretations of copyrights, 
                                                                                                                           
 262 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 (2005) 
(noting that the respondent marketed a product with the intent to profit from the infringement 
of others and encouraged such infringement). 
 263 See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013, 1019, 1022 (addressing arguments for direct, contribu-
tory and vicarious liability); Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 (2005) (addressing arguments for contri-
butory and vicarious liability but ultimately holding respondent liable under a theory of induce-
ment liability). 
 264 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). 
 265 See discussion infra Part III(a). 
 266 See Dallon, supra note 2, at 367-68. 
 267 The “public benefit” rationale and its history in copyright is discussed in detail in Part 
III(a) of this comment. 
 268 See S. Rep. No. 104-315 at 3 (listing “fairness to the artist” as a factor in passing the 
CTEA). 
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in Eldred,269 Napster270 and Aimster,271 suggest that the courts, while they 
do mention the public benefit rationale, have acted mainly to protect 
the rights of the copyright holders, often at the expense of the public 
and without proof that the protection incentivizes creation.  Courts 
have tried to strike a balance between copyright holders’ benefits, the 
artists’ incentives and the public domain, but the axis of this balance is 
in the wrong place. 
1. Balancing artist’s incentive with the public benefit 
A discussion of a proper balance between artists’ rights and the 
public benefit should start by recognizing two extremes.  The public 
would achieve the maximum benefit from an artists’ work if it had 
completely unhindered “productive” and “reproductive” use of it.  Of 
course, the copyright clause, the Statute of Anne, and the printers li-
censes before it have underscored the point that the “maximum public 
benefit” is not achievable because artists would have no “incentive” to 
create new works.272  On the other side of the pendulum, the “maxi-
mum artists’ benefit” would be achieved through perpetual copyright.  
History, however, explicitly rejects this conclusion in favor of the pub-
lic benefit rationale.273  It is clear that a balance is necessary, but that 
balance should be focused from a de minimis perspective in terms of 
copyright, and should take into account a number of factors, including 
the realities of how the “method” of monetary incentives relates to 
artists’ decisions to create works in a given industry. 
The doctrine of “fair use” has historically been the judiciary’s me-
thod of guarding against the harshness of copyright statutes, but this 
doctrine should be broadened to ensure that the Copyright Act meets 
the underlying “purpose” of the Copyright Clause.  In other words, the 
judiciary, in an effort to ensure that Congress has not overstepped the 
limitations provided under the Copyright Clause, should engage in a 
“public benefit” assessment of Congressional legislation and deter-
mine the minimum amount of copy protection necessary in order to 
maintain an incentive for artists to create new works.  This judicial 
                                                                                                                           
 269 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199, 204 (2003) (accepting, under rational review, 
Congress’ extension of the protection provided by the Copyright Act by 20 years). 
 270 See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (ignoring 
the premise that the public benefits merely from having access to music online). 
 271 See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (ignoring the 
premise that the public benefits merely from having access to all of this music online). 
 272 There is, of course, the Jewish law-based argument that attribution and accurate copying 
are protection enough because writers and artists have reasons besides monetary incentive to 
create expressive works.  This argument has also been addressed in an Internet context.  See 
generally Litman, supra note 16, at 24-25. 
 273 This concept is addressed in detail in Part III(a) of this comment. 
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balancing would necessitate an “in-between” standard for noncom-
mercial use, where there is no commercial piracy and the “potential 
market effect” is only judged by the aggregate effects of copying co-
pyrighted material. 
This is not to say that artists should receive only a minimum of 
protection.  From an “artists’ benefit” perspective, the core of copy-
right law should be focused on the prevention of profitable uses.  
Copyright owners should definitely be allowed to prevent others from 
making a profit off of their work, but where the question of profit is in 
the aggregate only, the court should consider additional factors in its 
fair use analysis beyond the traditional four factors mandated by the 
1976 act.274  Courts (and legislatures) should examine (1) the incentive 
provided to the author by his industry and whether the author’s pri-
mary incentive in the creation of the works in question is monetary,275 
(2) how long, on average, that monetary incentive lasts,276 (3) whether a 
given restriction on copyrighted material displaces other uses of a 
technology that may ultimately be “fair,” and (4) whether the benefit 
provided to the public by the availability and enjoyment of expressive 
works displaces potential loss in artists’ incentives. If “public benefit” 
is the central concern, what is the point of limiting access to an artists’ 
work when the artist is not making money from it and the limitation 
imposes restrictions that infringe on legitimate uses? 
2. Balancing P2P file sharing 
Applying this rationale in a P2P context demonstrates two things: 
first, there are already a number of “fair” or “arguably fair” uses for 
P2P technology.  These programs can be used to download public do-
main material as easily as they can be used to download copyrighted 
                                                                                                                           
 274 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 275 If it can be shown that, on average, artists receive no money (or very little) from the 
publication of their works, where does this leave the rationale of the artists’ incentive?  If artists 
are creating works for free, and the public would be most benefited by access to those works, 
why impose restrictions on them at all?  Placing these limitations on use makes sense when it is 
necessary to protect copyright holders who are engaging in dissemination, but if technology 
serves the dissemination function, we should be willing to reevaluate copyright incentives that 
have been based on the necessity of remunerating publishers. 
 276 This would essentially be a reason for a reduction of the terms of copyright protection 
rather than an extension of fair use, although one could argue that the fact that a work is past its 
moneymaking prime could enhance an argument for noncommercial fair use.  Furthermore, 
record companies routinely stop printing albums after sales drop below a given level, which is 
usually after a few years.  Singer-songwriter Janis Ian states flatly that she is “annoyed that so 
many records I once owned are out of print, and the only place I could find them was Napster.”  
Ian Article, supra note 95. 
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material.277  The Supreme Court has ratified “time shifting” as a fair 
use, arguably, those listening to songs they already heard on the radio 
are merely “time-shifting” those materials on their own.  The argu-
ment that the listeners are getting commercial-free, deejay-free ver-
sions of those recordings is irrelevant, since the same could be accom-
plished by the studious use of a cassette player or CD-recorder.  
There are other “arguably fair” uses of P2P networks which in-
clude “space-shifting,” “sampling,” and “library-building” that could 
be considered fair, but this is not really the point, because it confers no 
direct financial benefit to its users, noncommercial trading should fall 
into that “in between” category where it is necessary for the court to 
look at how private file sharing is affecting the author’s incentive to 
create and the invention and use of new technologies. 
This balance first necessitates a examination of the music indus-
try as a whole in order to answer the first two “factors”: (1) the incen-
tive provided to the author by his industry and whether the author’s 
primary incentive in the creation of the works in question is monetary 
and (2) how long, on average, that monetary incentive lasts.   
If artists made CDs in order to make money in the music indus-
try, they would be very poor.  The average professional artist—after 
production, distribution, and promotion costs—actually loses money 
on his CDs.278  Most artists make most of their money from playing in 
live shows and, in some cases, merchandising, but only artists at the 
very top of the industry ever see any money from the sale of their 
CDs.  Therefore, it would be fair to say that even if artists got into the 
“music business” to make money, the primary benefactor of CD prof-
its is the middleman, the record label.  This is similar to the “printer’s 
licenses” in medieval Europe, which were set in place specifically to 
ensure that publishers would recoup their costs for production and 
distribution without fear that their market would be diluted by for-
                                                                                                                           
 277 By themselves, P2P programs are simply file searching and transferring mechanisms that 
do not discriminate between file types.  See discussion infra Part II(a). 
 278 See Albini, supra note 188.  Steve Albini, a record industry insider, breaks down the cash 
amounts involved in an average recording contract and how those amounts are generally stacked 
against artists.  Albini notes that after making the first album in a four album contract and ac-
counting for all of the industry-standard deductions, his hypothetical major label band: 
 
is now 1/4 of the way through its contract, has made the music industry more than 3 
million dollars richer, but is in the hole $14,000 on royalties. The band members have 
each earned about 1/3 as much as they would working at a 7-11, but they got to ride 
in a tour bus for a month.  The next album will be about the same, except that the 
record company will insist they spend more time and money on it.  Since the pre-
vious one never "recouped," the band will have no leverage, and will oblige. 
 
Id. 
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profit pirates.  The costs incurred in the production of music, however, 
have decreased dramatically with the advent of digital technology.279  It 
simply does not cost as much today to make a song or a record as it 
did 10 years ago, and to the extent that record companies say it costs 
the same or more, they are simply being wasteful.  Furthermore, the 
costs that are incurred in distributing music are precisely the same 
costs that are (or should be) significantly reduced by the Internet.  It is 
simply no longer necessary to press hundreds of thousands of CDs 
and ship them across the United States because posting them on a 
single website with enough bandwidth accomplishes precisely the 
same end.  Record companies should not ask, via copyright infringe-
ment suits in the courts, for the public to subsidize an outmoded me-
thod of production and distribution. 
The average life of a song, in terms of being a viable candidate for 
printing and distribution, is much shorter than its viability for taking 
up not-very-much space on several thousand hard drives in a P2P 
network.280  Certainly, there are songs that have a long “shelf-life” and 
are worth printing and shipping again and again, but these are the ex-
ception, not the rule.  Examining copyright from a public benefit per-
spective should give us pause in saying that the rule should be written 
from the perspective of the exception.  If we acknowledge that a large 
number of the songs available on P2P networks have outlived their 
“profitable lives,” and we acknowledge that the public would benefit 
from access to those songs, and we assume that those songs are not 
being used to make a profit for someone other than the author, there 
is no incentive to curtail their private use and enjoyment by members 
of the public. 
The third aspect of the “in-between” balancing test asks us to ex-
amine the nature of P2P file-sharing services themselves and ask 
whether a restriction on the use of that software would undermine the 
public benefit of the copyright clause by placing restrictions on the 
“fair use” of other works already in the public domain.  The balance of 
this factor clearly lies in favor of the P2P networks, since, in addition 
to the other arguments posed above, curtailing infringing activity on 
                                                                                                                           
 279 The wide availability and high quality of digital recording equipment has significantly 
decreased the fixed costs of producing music.  Expensive reel-to-reel machines that were ubi-
quitous 30 years ago are now only in vogue for artists seeking a “vintage” sound. 
 280 For a very interesting viewpoint on consumer behavior with the Internet as a vehicle for 
finding and disseminating works, see Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, WIRED MAG. (October 
2004), available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html. Anderson posits that the 
future lies in Internet technology’s ability to address cultural niches, because the Internet, with 
its ability to store information cheaply and indefinitely and its ability to reach out to consumers 
all over the world, can make potentially valuable markets by aggregating a world full of users 
with common interests. See id. 
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these networks would necessarily curtail the public benefit provided 
by the availability of these file-sharing programs in the first place.  The 
public’s access to works in the public domain should be the chief con-
sideration, and since P2P file sharing improves access to these works, 
it should not be curtailed. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
“fair use” rationale in Williams & Wilkins and in Sony.  
The fourth aspect of the “in-between” balancing test is simple 
balance, does the benefit provided to the public by the availability and 
enjoyment of these works displace the artists’ incentives to create new 
works?  Since artists receive very little money for the writing and pro-
duction of their CDs, it is hard to argue that allowing P2P file sharing 
will impact the amount an artist can make on a CD, and therefore im-
pact their financial incentive to create new works.  It will impact the 
middlemen, the record labels, who are making the lion’s share of the 
profit from CD sales.  Under the old copyright regime of the 1976 act, 
this would have been disastrous because an artist’s only route to the 
public was via a well-financed music publishing and distributing entity, 
but this is simply no longer true. It is important to keep in mind, how-
ever, that this new standard does not affect an artists’ right to make all 
profit from the sale of his material, it merely suggests that where the 
material is being consumed and shared in a noncommercial sense, not 
sold, the standards should be different. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
File sharing, whether we like it or not, is here to stay.  Regardless 
of whether any of the arguments above are compelling, this technolo-
gy is a reality that we are going to have to start dealing with sooner or 
later.  Record companies may not be able to “compete with free,” and 
in spite of the Supreme Court’s ruling holding Grokster liable, file 
sharing probably cannot be stopped because the program architecture 
is entirely decentralized.281 
But where does the law sit?  Recognizing that file sharing is here 
to stay and saying it is legal are two different things.  History, however, 
supports a vision of copyright law that is grounded in prohibiting 
commercial infringement, and seems to have been designed for a 
physical distribution system that is currently an outmoded means of 
production.  Furthermore, copyright is a statutory monopoly, and like 
other monopolies, we should approach copyright from a perspective 
that applies the minimum amount of protection necessary to accom-
plish its purpose, incentivizing the creation of expressive content.  If 
                                                                                                                           
 281 At the time this conclusion was written, on Saturday, February 4th, 2006, there were 
2,611,175 users on the now-illegal FastTrack network sharing 273,066,117 files with one another. 
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the current state of the recording industry makes it clear that artists 
create not with the hope of financial remuneration but with the hope 
of increasing their exposure to audiences worldwide, then our under-
standing of copyright as a potentially repressive monopoly would re-
quire us to restrict the protection.  In other words, if artists will create 
music recordings for free, then we should not impose a monopoly that 
makes the public pay for musc.  
With that premise in mind, we then need to consider whether the 
law affords our legal system a vehicle for this emerging jurisprudence.  
The fair use doctrine would be an excellent way for courts to reinstate 
an understanding of copyright law based on the concerns described 
above. Under section 107 of the Copyright Act, courts are allowed to 
take other factors into consideration besides the four factors listed in 
the act itself.282  A public interest based version of copyright jurispru-
dence should prompt courts to examine (1) the incentive provided to 
the author by his industry and whether the author’s primary incentive 
in the creation of the works in question is monetary, (2) how long, on 
average, that monetary incentive lasts, (3) whether a given restriction 
on copyrighted material displaces other uses of a technology that may 
ultimately be “fair,” and (4) whether the benefit provided to the pub-
lic by the availability and enjoyment of expressive works displaces 
potential loss in artists’ incentives.  Applying this rationale to P2P file 
sharing makes it clear that this use could easily be considered fair, at 
least under circumstances where the end-user is not making a profit 
from an artist’s copyrighted work. 
This article is simply attempt to match the law to what appears to 
be an emerging economic reality.  The public is unlikely to support a 
law that holds a large number of Americans liable to major record 
conglomerates because they downloaded the new Beastie Boys song 
they just heard on the radio.  In fact, history lends support an alternate 
understanding of what copyright is designed to do, and, as with the 
photocopier and the VCR, we should endorse a vision of copyright 
that balances the public’s expectations with the incentives of artists. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
